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INTRODUCTION

For over three years, Randy Lunsford and his ex-wife, Dawn
Collins Bean, have been fighting over their daughter's $100,000
wrongful death award.' Their daughter, Candice Lunsford ("Candi"),
was tragically killed in an automobile accident just nine days after her
eighteenth birthday.2 Mrs. Bean, as the admistratrix of Candi's estate,
obtained the wrongful death award on behalf of her daughter's
estate.3 In North Carolina, wrongful death proceeds are not part of
1. In re Estate of Lunsford, 143 N.C. App. 646, 647-48, 547 S.E.2d 483, 484, vacated
and remanded by 354 N.C. 571, 556 S.E.2d 292 (2001); see Appellant's Brief at 6, In re
Estate of Lunsford,__ N.C. App.

-,

S.E.2d

-

(

) (No. COA02-904).

2. Lunsford, 143 N.C. App. at 647-48, 547 S.E.2d at 484; see Appellant's Brief at 4, 6,
Lunsford (No. COA02-904).
3. See Application for Letters of Administration, In re Estate of Candice Leigh
Lunsford, Surry County, N.C. (July 9, 1999, File No. 99 E 318) (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review); Oath, In re Estate of Candice Leigh Lunsford, Surry County, N.C.
(July 9, 1999, File No. 99 E 318) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). See
generally N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-18-2(a) (2001) (providing that the decedent's personal
representative or collector must bring the wrongful death action); Burcl v. N.C. Baptist
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the decedent's estate, but instead are paid to the survivors in
accordance with the Intestate Succession Act.4 Section 31A-2 of the
General Statutes of North Carolina applies to the Intestate
Succession Act5 to prevent a parent who abandons his or her child
from inheriting from the child through intestate succession. 6 Mrs.
Bean contends that Mr. Lunsford abandoned their daughter and is
therefore barred from sharing in the wrongful death award.7 Mr.

Lunsford counters that he did not abandon his daughter;8 that even if
he did abandon his daughter, because a court order gave Mrs. Bean
full custody of Candi, he therefore falls under an exception to section

31A-2;9 that section 31A-2 only applies when a child dies as a minor
and because Candi died after reaching the age of majority, the statute
does not bar him from recovering; 10 and that the statute barring
recovery is so vague as to be unconstitutional. 1
Superior Court Judge L. Todd Burke found that Mr. Lunsford
had abandoned Candi and denied him a share of the wrongful death
proceeds. 12 On appeal, the North Carolina Court of Appeals upheld

Hosp., Inc., 306 N.C. 214, 217, 293 S.E.2d 85, 87 (1982) (stating that the personal
representative or collector must bring a wrongful death action and that a parent in her
individual capacity may not bring a wrongful death action (citing § 28A-18-2(a))).
4. § 28A-18-2(a) (stating that "[t]he amount recovered [in a wrongful death action]
... shall be disposed of as provided in the Intestate Succession Act"); Williford v.
Williford, 288 N.C. 506, 508, 219 S.E.2d 220, 222 (1975) ("It is well established that the
proceeds of an action brought for wrongful death are not assets of the estate of the
deceased and are not 'any part of' his estate." Under the wrongful death statute, they are
distributed in accordance with the Intestate Succession Act.).
5. §§ 29-1 to -30.
6. Id. § 31A-2; see Williford, 288 N.C. at 508, 219 S.E.2d at 222 (stating that section
31A-2 "must be deemed a part of the Intestate Succession Act"). Section 31A-2
specifically modifies section 29-15(3) of the Intestate Succession Act, which prescribes
when parents inherit through intestate succession. § 29-15(3); Williford, 288 N.C. at 50809, 219 S.E.2d at 222-23.
7. Appellee's Brief at 2-8, Lunsford (No. COA02-904).
8. Appellant's Brief at 9-11, Lunsford (No. COA02-904).
9. Id. at 11-15.
10. Id. at 15-25.
11. Id. at 25-26. Mr. Lunsford only made this constitutional argument after the North
Carolina Supreme Court vacated and remanded the decision of the North Carolina Court
of Appeals. See id. (arguing that section 31A-2 is unconstitutionally vague); Appellant's
New Brief, In re Estate of Lunsford, 354 N.C. 571, 556 S.E.2d 292 (2001) (No. 362A01)
(lacking an argument that section 31A-2 is unconstitutionally vague); Appellant's Brief, In
re Estate of Lunsford, 143 N.C. App. 646, 547 S.E.2d 483 (2001) (No. COA0O-674)
(lacking an argument that section 31A-2 is unconstitutionally vague). An analysis of Mr.
Lunsford's constitutional argument is beyond the scope of this Comment.
S.E.2d
12. Record on Appeal at 26, In re Estate of Lunsford, - N.C. App ....
( ) (No. COA02-904).
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the superior court judge's decision. 3 It refused to disturb his finding
of abandonment,14 and it held that section 31A-2 applied to Mr.
Lunsford even though Candi died after reaching the age of majority
because the term "child" in section 31A-2 means "child of any age,"
not just "minor child."15 Instead of ruling on any of the legal issues,
the North Carolina Supreme Court issued a short opinion vacating
the court of appeals's decision and remanding the case for additional
factual findings. 6 On April 12, 2002, Judge Burke found that Mr.
Lunsford had abandoned his daughter and should be barred from
inheriting because he did not meet either of the two exceptions to the
statute. 7 Mr. Lunsford then appealed the judge's decision. 8 The
case is currently before the North Carolina Court of Appeals. 9
Lunsford illustrates the imprecision and potential inequity of
section 31A-2 of the General Statutes of North Carolina. Although
the goal of the statute is to prevent a parent who abandons a child
from inheriting from that child or sharing in that child's wrongful
death award,2" the statute does not specify the precise circumstances
that prevent the parent from sharing in intestate succession. Its
language does not indicate whether a parent is only barred from
sharing if the child is a minor,2' it does not describe when a parent has
abandoned the child or merely complied with a court order giving

13. In re Estate of Lunsford, 143 N.C. App. 646, 654, 547 S.E.2d 483, 488, vacated and
remanded by 354 N.C. 571, 556 S.E.2d 292 (2001).
14. Id. at 652, 547 S.E.2d at 486.
15. Id. at 652-53, 547 S.E.2d at 486-87.
16. In re Estate of Lunsford, 354 N.C. 571, 571, 556 S.E.2d 292, 292 (2001). The North
Carolina Supreme Court wanted further findings on the following issues: (1) whether Mr.
Lunsford had abandoned his daughter; (2) whether, when, and for how long he had
resumed the care and maintenance of his daughter; and (3) whether he had "substantially
complied" with the custody order's requirements for the support and maintenance of his
daughter. Id.
17. Record at 68--70. The statute contains two exceptions. Ifthe parent resumes
continuous "care and maintenance" for at least one year before the child's death or if a
court order is the reason the parent no longer has custody of the child and the parent
complies with his child-support requirements, the parent will not be barred from
inheriting. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31A-2 (2001).
18. Appellant's Brief, In re Estate of Lunsford,

(-)

-

N.C. App.

S.E.2d

__

(No. COA02-904).
19. North Carolina Court of Appeals Calendar, Cases Without Oral Arguments,
Week of Mar. 24, 2003, at 2 (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (stating that
Judges Patricia Timmons-Goodson, Wanda G. Bryant, and Martha A. Geer are scheduled
to decide Lunsford).
20. Williford v. Williford, 288 N.C. 506, 508-10, 219 S.E.2d 220, 222-23 (1975); supra
notes 4-6.
21. See infra notes 43-154 and accompanying text.
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custody to another person,22 and it does not give clear guidance as to
how the parent can correct his past conduct to again share in intestate
succession.2 3

This Comment exposes these deficiencies and critiques the
majority and dissenting opinions in the court of appeals's decision.
Part I analyzes the court of appeals's holding that section 31A-2 bars
an abandoning parent from inheriting from his child, regardless of the
child's age. This Comment concludes that the court of appeals was
correct in applying section 31A-2 to prevent inheritance from a child
who had reached the age of majority but used faulty legal reasoning
to reach this holding. Part I also addresses the question of whether
Mr. Lunsford should be entitled to inherit under an exception to
section 31A-2 that allows an abandoning parent to inherit if he was
"deprived of the custody" of his child and "substantially complied"
with his child support obligations. This Comment concludes that the
court of appeals's decision that Mr. Lunsford did not qualify for this
exception is incorrect. The court's decision in Lunsford illustrates the
ambiguities in section 31A-2. These ambiguities make it impossible
to construe that section in a manner that carries out the legislature's
intentions for enacting the statute while at the same time operating
equitably and with reasonable certainty. Part II proposes major
revisions to section 31A-2 so that it clearly states when a parent who
has abandoned his child may or may not inherit through intestate
succession. The death of a child is difficult enough for a family, and
section 31A-2 needlessly compounds a family's suffering by fueling
litigation over who is entitled to inherit or share in wrongful death
proceeds. While no law could ever eliminate this type of litigation, a
clearer law should at least reduce unnecessary legal wrangling and
speed the disposition of the child's estate.
I. INREESTATE OFLUNSFORD

The North Carolina Intestate Succession Act determines who
inherits from someone who dies without a will or with a will that fails

22. See infra notes 155-81 and accompanying text.
23. See infra note 211 and accompanying text. To provide clarity and to be consistent
with the facts in Lunsford, this Comment uses male pronouns to refer to abandoning
parents and female pronouns to refer to abandoned children. It must be stressed,
however, that section 31A-2 of the General Statutes of North Carolina is gender-neutral,
and the use of male or female pronouns does not imply that fathers or mothers are more
or less likely to abandon their children or should be treated differently. See N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 31A-2 (2001).
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to distribute all of her assets.24 The Intestate Succession Act also
governs the distribution of wrongful death awards25 and workers'
compensation death benefits,2 6 even though they are not part of
decedents' estates. 27 This Act provides that the estate of a person
who dies intestate without a spouse, child, or any lineal descendants
will pass to her parents in equal shares if both parents are alive or to
the surviving parent if one is dead.28 Section 31A-2 of the General
Statutes of North Carolina, however, bars a parent from inheriting
through intestate succession or sharing in a wrongful death award if
he abandons his child. 9
As Lunsford reveals, section 31A-2 is ambiguous. It does not
specify whether a parent is barred from inheriting from a minor child
or a child of any age, nor does it clearly state when an abandoning
parent meets the exceptions to the statute and is allowed to inherit or
share in a wrongful death award. The statute states:
Any parent who has wilfully abandoned the care and
maintenance of his or her child3" shall lose all right to
24. §§ 29-1 to -30 (Intestate Succession Act); id. § 31-42 (Failure of Devises by Lapse
or Otherwise); id. §§ 31A-1 to -15 (Acts Barring Property Rights).
25. See supra note 4.
26. § 28A-18-2 (Death by Wrongful Act of Another; Recovery Not Assets); id. § 31A2 (Acts Barring Rights of Parents); id. § 97-40 (Commutation and Payment of [Workers']
Compensation in Absence of Dependents). In 1971, the North Carolina Supreme Court
held that section 31A-2 applied to the earlier version of section 97-40 to prevent an
abandoning parent from sharing in a workers' compensation death benefit. Smith v.
Allied Exterminators, Inc., 279 N.C. 583, 588-89, 184 S.E.2d 296, 299-300 (1971). The
current Workers' Compensation Act includes an explicit provision preventing an
abandoning parent from sharing in a death benefit paid under the Act, and the sole
purpose of the Intestate Succession Act is to determine the order of priority of
nondependents entitled to receive death benefits. § 97-40; Davis v. MacMillan, 148 N.C.
App. 248, 253 n.2, 558 S.E.2d 210, 213-14 n.2 (stating that section 31A-2 no longer applies
to section 97-40), discretionaryreview denied, 355 N.C. 490, 563 S.E.2d 564 (2002).
27. § 28A-18-2 (governing the distribution of wrongful death proceeds); § 97-40
(governing the distribution of workers' compensation proceeds); Williford v. Williford,
288 N.C. 506, 508, 219 S.E.2d 220, 222 (1975) (holding that wrongful death proceeds are
not part of the decedent's estate); Smith, 279 N.C. at 588, 184 S.E.2d at 299 (holding that
workers' compensation death benefits are not part of the decedent's estate); supra notes 4,
26, and accompanying text.
28. § 29-15(3) (specifying when parents inherit from their children).
29. Id. § 31A-2.
30. Two standard definitions of abandonment are used by North Carolina courts:
Any wilful or intentional conduct on the part of the parent which evinces a
settled purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to
the child. Wilful intent is an integral part of abandonment and this is a question
of fact to be determined from the evidence.
Abandonment has also been defined as wilful neglect and refusal to perform
the natural and legal obligations of parental care and support. It has been held
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intestate succession in any part of the child's estate and all
right to administer the estate of the child, except (1) Where the abandoning parent resumed its care and
maintenance at least one year prior to the death of the
child and continued the same until its death; or
(2) Where a parent has been deprived of the custody of
his or her child under an order of a court of competent
jurisdiction and the parent has substantially complied
with all orders of the court requiring contribution to the
support of the child. 3
In Lunsford, the court of appeals gave two primary reasons for
holding that Mr. Lunsford could not receive one-half of the wrongful
death proceeds. First, it concluded that section 31A-2 applied to Mr.
Lunsford by determining that the term "child" in section 31A-2
means "child of any age. "32 To support this construction, it cited The
American Heritage Dictionary and Black's Legal Dictionary, which

both define "child" as "child of any age. '33 To further support its
definition, the court of appeals reasoned that the legislature, when
drafting the statute, did not use the term "minor child," and the
legislature usually uses the term "minor" to refer to a child under the
age of eighteen.34 Having established that "child" means "child of
any age," the court concluded that unless the second exception to the
statute applied to Mr. Lunsford, he was barred from recovering.
The court determined that the divorce judgment technically had not
deprived Mr. Lunsford of the custody of his daughter because the
judgment had not terminated his parental rights.36 . Finding no
deprivation of custody, the court held that the statutory exception did
not apply and Mr. Lunsford was therefore barred from sharing in the
wrongful death award.37
that if a parent withholds his presence, his love, his care, the opportunity to
display filial affection, and wilfully neglects to lend support and maintenance,
such parent relinquishes all parental claims and abandons the child.
Hixson v. Krebs, 136 N.C. App. 183, 188, 523 S.E.2d 684, 687 (1999) (internal alteration
and citations omitted) (quoting Pratt v. Bishop, 257 N.C. 486, 501, 126 S.E.2d 597, 608
(1962)).
31. § 31A-2.
32. In re Estate of Lunsford, 143 N.C. App. 646, 652-53, 547 S.E.2d 483, 486-87,
vacated and remanded by 354 N.C. 571, 556 S.E.2d 292 (2001).
33. Id. (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 239 (6th ed. 1990); THE AMERICAN
HERITAGE DICTIONARY 265 (2d college ed. 1985)).
34. Id. at 653, 547 S.E.2d at 487.
35. Id. at 653-54, 547 S.E.2d at 487-88.
36. Id.
37. Id.
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This Comment ultimately agrees with the court of appeals's
conclusion that the term "child" in section 31A-2 means "child of any
age,"38 but disagrees with the court's reasoning. The court relied on
38. The court of appeals stated that the question of whether "child" means "child of
any age" or "minor child" was "an issue of first impression." Id. at 652, 547 S.E.2d at 486.
Even though North Carolina courts have previously applied section 31A-2 to prevent
abandoning parents from inheriting from children who died after reaching the age of
majority, these cases did not explicitly decide this question. Therefore, this Comment
agrees with the court of appeals. In Williford v. Williford, 288 N.C. 506, 219 S.E.2d 220
(1975), the plaintiff's brief to the North Carolina Supreme Court stated that the deceased
child had reached the age of majority. Plaintiff Appellant's New Brief at 5, Williford v.
Williford, 288 N.C. 506, 219 S.E.2d 220 (1975) (No. 66). In Smith v. Allied Exterminators,
Inc., 279 N.C. 583, 184 S.E.2d 296 (1971), the defendants' brief to the North Carolina
Court of Appeals stated that the child died at age twenty-two. Defendant Appellants'
Brief at 2, Smith v. Allied Exterminators, Inc., 11 N.C. App. 76, 180 S.E.2d 390 (1971) (No.
7114IC109). The opinions in Williford and Smith do not mention specifically that the
children died after reaching the age of majority, but they both hold that because the father
abandoned the children during their "minority," he was not entitled to recover. See
Williford, 288 N.C. at 509-10, 219 S.E.2d at 223 (citing Smith, 279 N.C. 583, 184 S.E.2d 296
(1971)) (applying the holding in Smith to prevent an abandoning parent from sharing in a
wrongful death award because he "had abandoned the deceased during the [deceased's]
minority"); Smith, 279 N.C. at 589, 184 S.E.2d at 300 (preventing the abandoning parent
from recovering because he "wilfully abandoned the care and maintenance of the
deceased during the latter's minority"). Mrs. Bean argues that these two cases, read in
conjunction with the briefs filed with the courts, establish that the North Carolina
Supreme Court has already decided that "child" means "child of any age." Appellee's
Brief at 15-17, In re Estate of Lunsford, _

N.C. App ...

, -

S.E.2d __ (-)

(No.

COA02-904) (citing and quoting Williford, 288 N.C. at 509, 219 S.E.2d at 223; Smith, 279
N.C. at 589, 184 S.E.2d at 300; Plaintiff Appellant's New Brief at 5, Williford (No. 66);
Defendant Appellant's Brief at 2, Smith (No. 7114IC109)). Mrs. Bean first made this
argument in her brief to the North Carolina Supreme Court. Petitioner Appellee's New
Brief at 5-7, In re Estate of Lunsford, 354 N.C. 571, 556 S.E.2d 292 (2001) (No. 362A01)
(citing Williford and Smith). She did not address them in her first brief to the North
Carolina Court of Appeals. See Appellee's Brief, In re Estate of Lunsford, 143 N.C. App.
646, 547 S.E.2d 483 (2001) (No. COAOO-674). In addition, Mrs. Bean did not point out
that Hixson v. Krebs, 136 N.C. App. 183, 523 S.E.2d 684 (1999), denied recovery to an
abandoning parent whose child died at age eighteen. See id. at 185, 523 S.E.2d at 685.
These omissions may explain why the court of appeals did not acknowledge that prior
North Carolina cases had denied relief to the abandoning parent when the child died after
reaching the age of majority even though these cases bolster the court of appeals's
reasoning. On the other hand, the court's language that "this is the first time this question
has been squarely presented to this Court," Lunsford, 143 N.C. App. at 652, 547 S.E.2d at
486, could indicate that the court was cognizant of the prior case law. See id. Because
neither the courts nor the parties in Williford, Smith, and Hixson specifically addressed the
issue of whether a parent should be barred from recovering even though his child died
after reaching the age of majority, these earlier cases should not control the resolution of
this question. Williford v. Williford, 288 N.C. 506, 219 S.E.2d 220 (1975); Smith v. Allied
Exterminators, Inc., 279 N.C. 583, 184 S.E.2d 296 (1971); Hixson v. Krebs, 136 N.C. App.
183, 523 S.E.2d 684 (1999); Plaintiff Appellant's New Brief, Williford (No. 66); Defendant
Appellee's New Brief, Williford (No. 66); Plaintiff Appellant's Supplemental Brief, Smith
v. Allied Exterminators, Inc., 279 N.C. 583, 184 S.E.2d 296 (1971) (No. 50); PetitionerAppellant's Brief, Hixson v. Krebs, 136 N.C. App. 183, 523 S.E.2d 684 (1999) (No.
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other statutes, legal and non-legal dictionaries, and notions of logic to
ultimately conclude that the term "child" is unambiguous and clearly
means "child of any age." This analysis is unpersuasive and legally
flawed. First, under established North Carolina law, the court should
not need to engage in statutory interpretation to determine if a term
is unambiguous-if the term is unambiguous, statutory interpretation
is unnecessary. Second, the court used faulty interpretive methods.
The court of appeals should have examined the use of the term
"child" within section 31A-2, its meaning in the Intestate Succession
Act, and the legislative history behind section 31A-2. Instead, the
court resorted to dictionaries and improperly applied unrelated
statutes in its attempt to determine the meaning of the term "child."
A.

Rules of Statutory Construction

The "cardinal principle" of statutory construction is that the
court's interpretation of the statute must comport with the
legislature's intent in enacting it.39 To determine the legislature's
intent, the court first must determine if the statute's language is "clear
and unambiguous. 4 0 If its language is "clear and unambiguous," then
the court must not engage in "judicial construction" but "must give
[the statute] its plain and definite meaning, and [is] without power to
interpolate, or superimpose, provisions and limitations not contained
therein."'" But if the language is unclear, the court must engage in
statutory construction to determine the legislature's intent and
construe the statute in accordance with that intent.42

COA99-239); Respondent-Appellee's Brief, Hixson (No. COA99-239); PetitionerAppellant's Reply Brief to Respondent-Appellee's Brief, Hixson (No. COA99-239);
Defendant Appellants' Brief, Smith (No. 71141C109); Plaintiff Appellee's Brief, Smith
(No. 71141C109).
39. Polaroid Corp. v. Offerman, 349 N.C. 290, 297,507 S.E.2d 284, 290 (1998).
40. Union Carbide Corp. v. Offerman, 351 N.C. 310, 314, 526 S.E.2d 167, 170 (2000).
41. In re Banks, 295 N.C. 236, 239, 244 S.E.2d 386, 388-89 (1978) (citations omitted).
Professor Singer argues, however, that by holding that statutory language is "clear and
unambiguous" and therefore no interpretation is necessary, a court has already engaged in
statutory interpretation.
2A NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION § 45:02 (6th ed. 2000).
42. Banks, 295 N.C. at 239, 244 S.E.2d at 389.
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Defining the Term "Child" in Section 31A-2: Does It Mean
"Child of Any Age" or "Minor Child"?

1. Lunsford's Analysis
In Lunsford, the court of appeals incorrectly held that the term
"child" in section 31A-2 is clear and unambiguous.43 A statute's
"language is ambiguous if reasonable minds could differ as to its
meaning; if a statute can support two reasonable interpretations, a
court must find the language of the statute to be ambiguous."' In
section 31A-2, an objective reader could reasonably interpret the
term "child" as meaning either "child of any age" or "minor child."
The term "child" is often used in section 31A-2 in the context of "care
and maintenance" and "abandonment."45 A parent cannot abandon
an adult child, nor does he have the obligation to support an adult
child.46
Although the context of section 31A-2 suggests that "child"
means "minor child," it is still unclear whether the legislature
intended "child" to mean "minor child" or "child of any age." This
ambiguity is apparent because the statute is logically consistent
regardless of the definition of "child." On the one hand, "child"
could mean just "minor child." The application of this meaning to the
term "child" would cause section 31A-2 to only bar parents from
inheriting from minor children.47 This meaning is consistent with the
"care and maintenance" provisions in the statute. On the other
hand, "child" could also mean "child of any age." Thus, the
legislature could have used "child" merely to identify the person the
parent abandoned. Under this meaning, section 31A-2 would bar
parents from inheriting regardless of the child's age.49 Using the term
"child" as an identifier does not conflict with the "care and
maintenance" provisions in section 31A-2. The legislature drafted
section 31A-2 to specify to whom the parent owed the "care and
maintenance," 0 not to substantively affect the duration of the
parent's "care and maintenance" obligations. Therefore, in the
43. Lunsford, 143 N.C. App. at 652-53,547 S.E.2d at 486-87.
44. 73 AM. JUR. 2D Statutes § 114 (2001) (footnote omitted); see also 2A SINGER,
supra note 41, § 45.02 (stating that "[a]mbiguity exists when a statute is capable of being
understood by reasonably well-informed persons in two or more different senses").
45. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31A-2 (2001); infra notes 77-87 and accompanying text.
46. See infra note 82.
47. See § 31A-2.
48. See id.
49. See id.
50. Id.
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context of section 31A-2, the definition of the term "child" is
ambiguous because it "can support two reasonable interpretations. 51
To support its holding that "child" in section 31A-2
unambiguously means "child of any age," the court of appeals
reasoned that unless the term "minor" is used to modify the term
"child," "child" means "person of any age. '52 The court reasoned
that sections 48A-1 and 48A-2 of the General Statutes of North
Carolina compelled this result. 3 At common law, a person under the
age of twenty-one was legally considered a minor.5 4 But in 1971, the
legislature enacted section 48A-1, which abrogated the common law
definition of minor. 55 Section 48A-2, enacted in conjunction with
section 48A-1, lowered the age of majority to eighteen.56 In Crouch v.
Crouch, the North Carolina Court of Appeals interpreted the
enactment of these sections to mean "that wherever the term 'minor,'
'minor child' or 'minor children' is used in a statute, the statute now
refers to age 18." 58 The court of appeals in Lunsford cited this
specific language from Crouch but misunderstood its meaning. 59 The
court stated, "We interpret [these statutes] to mean that, unless the
word 'minor' is inserted before the word 'child,' then 'child' can be a
person of any age."6 This reasoning is erroneous. The purpose of
Chapter 48A is to change the meaning of statutes that use the term
''minor" so that these statutes apply only to persons under eighteen,
as opposed to persons under twenty-one. 6' Chapter 48A does not
apply to statutes like section 31A-2 that do not use the term "minor,"
nor does it mandate that any statute referring to a minor child use the
term "minor.""

51. 73 AM. JUR. 2D Statutes § 114 (2001).
52. In re Estate of Lunsford, 143 N.C. App. 646, 652, 547 S.E.2d 483, 487, vacated and
remanded by 354 N.C. 571, 556 S.E.2d 292 (2001).
53. Id.
54. Crouch v. Crouch, 14 N.C. App. 49, 50,187 S.E.2d 348, 349 (1972).
55. § 48A-1; Act of June 17, 1971, ch. 585, § 1, 1971 N.C. Sess. Laws 510, 510 (codified
at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48A-1 (2001)).
56. See §§ 48A-1, -2; § 1, 1971 N.C. Sess. Laws at 510 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 48A-2 (2001)); Crouch, 14 N.C. App. at 50-51,187 S.E.2d at 349.
57. 14 N.C. App. 49, 187 S.E.2d 348 (1972).
58. Id. at 51,187 S.E.2d at 349.
59. See In re Estate of Lunsford, 143 N.C. App. 646, 652, 547 S.E.2d 483, 487 (citing
Crouch, 14 N.C. App. at 51,187 S.E.2d at 349), vacated and remanded by 354 N.C. 571, 556
S.E.2d 292 (2001).
60. Id. (citing Crouch, 14 N.C. App. at 51, 187 S.E.2d at 349). The court in Lunsford
did not state its reasoning for this extension of Crouch. See id.
61. See §§ 48A-1, -2; Crouch, 14 N.C. App. at 50-51,187 S.E.2d at 349.
62. See §§ 48A-1, -2; Crouch, 14 N.C. App. at 50-51,187 S.E.2d at 349.
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The court next reasoned that the dictionary definitions of the
term "child" are evidence that the unambiguous meaning of that term
is "child of any age."" The court stated that "[The American
Heritage] Dictionary defines a child as '[a] son or a daughter; an
offspring.'

"I

The court also cited Black's Law Dictionary as

"defin[ing] a child as '[p]rogeny; offspring of parentage.' "65 The
court relied on these dictionaries to conclude that "child may be a
newborn or a person of any age. '66 But the court failed to
demonstrate the relevance of dictionaries to its conclusions. Clearly
the court could not have intended to cite these dictionaries to support
the proposition that the only meaning of the term "child" is "child of
any age" because both dictionaries further define "child" as a young
person.67 The dictionary definitions of "child" undermine the court's
holding that the term "child" in the statute is unambiguous because,
in actuality, they support the argument that there are two reasonable
interpretations of the definition of "child."
The court further reasoned that "child" must mean "child of any

age" because "[t]he law has singled out certain ages and attributed
legal significance to them. '68 This reasoning builds upon the court's
earlier conclusions regarding the application of sections 48A-1 and
48A-2.6 9 The court stated that "[g]enerally, the Legislature has used

the term 'minor child' when the age of eighteen is significant."7 The
court also found that "Black's Law Dictionary defines a minor as '[a]n
63. Lunsford, 143 N.C. App. at 653, 547 S.E.2d at 487.
64. Id. (quoting THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 265 (2d college ed. 1985)).
65. Id. (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 239 (6th ed. 1990)).
66. Id.
67. The American Heritage Dictionary defines "child" as "[a] person between birth
and puberty," "an unborn infant; fetus," "an infant; baby." THE AMERICAN HERITAGE
DICTIONARY 265 (2d college ed. 1985). In fact, this dictionary lists these definitions
before the definition the court of appeals cited. Id. The court of appeals cited the sixth
edition of Black's Law Dictionary. Lunsford, 143 N.C. App. at 653, 547 S.E.2d at 487
(citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 239 (6th ed. 1990)). This edition of Black's first
defines "child" as "[p]rogeny; offspring of parentage." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 239
(6th ed. 1990). But it further defines "child" as an "[u]nborn or recently born human
being" and gives the common law definition of "child" as "one who had not attained the
age of fourteen years, though the meaning now varies in different statutes." Id. The
seventh edition of Black's Law Dictionary further defines "child" as "[a] boy or girl; a
young person." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 232 (7th ed. 1999). In addition, it states that
"[a]t common law, ['child' was defined as a] person who has not reached the age of 14,
though the age now varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction." Id. The seventh edition lists
these two definitions of "child" before the definition the court embraces. Id.
68. Lunsford, 143 N.C. App. at 653, 547 S.E.2d at 487.
69. See id. at 652, 547 S.E.2d at 487 (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 48A-1, -2 (1999));
supra notes 52-62 and accompanying text.
70. Lunsford, 143 N.C. App. at 653, 547 S.E.2d at 487.
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infant or person who is under the age of legal competence ....

In

most states, a person is no longer a minor after reaching the age of 18
...

'-".

Although this citation of Black's is technically correct, it

cannot support the court's holding. As discussed previously, one of
the definitions of "child" in the seventh edition of Black's is "a young
person. '72 The seventh edition of Black's further defines "minor" as
"a child or juvenile. '73 Black's therefore cannot establish that the
only plain and ordinary meaning of the term "child" is "child of any
age.''
The court then engaged in judicial construction of the statute to
assist it in deciding that the plain meaning of "child" is "child of any
age." The court reasoned that a construction of the term "child" as
"minor child" would be illogical because, applying that definition, an
abandoning parent could not inherit from a minor child but could
inherit from an adult child. 74 The court's reasoning contradicts
established North Carolina precedent. Once a court determines that
the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, it must apply that
language and should not engage in judicial construction. 75 Thus, the
court's act of judicial construction is evidence that the language is
ambiguous because otherwise judicial construction would be
unnecessary.
2. This Comment's Analysis
As the preceding analysis demonstrates, the court of appeals
should have found the term "child" to be ambiguous and should not
have engaged in judicial construction to prove that the term "child" is
unambiguous. Instead, it should have first concluded that the term
"child" is reasonably susceptible to two meanings and should have
engaged in statutory interpretation to determine which meaning the
legislature intended.76 Only by rigorously applying the proper rules of
statutory interpretation will the court's opinion truly answer the
71. Id. (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 997 (6th ed. 1990)).
72. See supra note 67.
73. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1011 (7th ed. 1999).
74. Lunsford, 143 N.C. App. at 653, 547 S.E.2d at 487. The court seems to cabin this
discussion as merely speculation not necessary to its opinion, but by making this
observation, the court strongly suggests that it relied on this reasoning, at least in part, in
making its decision. See id.
75. Union Carbide Corp. v. Offerman, 351 N.C. 310, 314-15, 526 S.E.2d 167, 170
(2000); In re Banks, 295 N.C. 236, 239, 244 S.E.2d 386, 388-89 (1978); supra notes 39-42
and accompanying text.
76. Frye Reg'l Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Hunt, 350 N.C. 39, 45, 510 S.E.2d 159, 163 (1999);
Banks, 295 N.C. at 239, 244 S.E.2d at 389.
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question of whether the term "child" means "child of any age" or
"minor child."
The court should have first looked to intrinsic aids to determine
the meaning of "child.""7 One intrinsic aid is how the legislature used
the term "child" in the context of section 31A-2. v8 In dissent, Chief
Judge Eagles reasoned that, in the context of the statute, "child" must
mean "minor child."79 In analyzing his claim, the definition of the
term "child" in the phrase "shall lose all right to intestate succession
in any part of the child's estate" is the controlling issue."0 The term
"child" appears six times in the statute.81 The first and sixth uses of
the term "child" exist in the context of parents' financial support,
which, because North Carolina law usually only obligates parents to
support their minor children,82 suggests that the legislature meant for
"child" to mean "minor child. 8 3 The fifth use of the term "child"
relates to parental custody of the child.' Again, a parent usually only
77. See HENRY C. BLACK, HANDBOOK ON THE CONSTRUCTION AND
INTERPRETATION OF THE LAWS 242-74, 276 (2d ed. 1911) (discussing the use of intrinsic
aids to resolve statutory ambiguities); see also 2A SINGER, supra note 41, § 45:14 (defining
intrinsic aids as "those which derive meaning from the internal structure of the text and
conventional or dictionary meanings of the terms used in it").
78. See BLACK, supra note 77, at 242-44 (stating that statutory terms must be
interpreted based on the context in which they are used); see also Underwood v. Howland,
274 N.C. 473, 479, 164 S.E.2d 2, 7 (1968) (quoting 7 STRONG's N.C. INDEX 2d, Statutes § 5
(1968)) (stating that "[wiords and phrases of a statute 'must be construed as a part of the
composite whole and accorded only that meaning which other modifying provisions and
the clear intent and purpose of the act will permit' ").
79. Lunsford, 143 N.C. App. at 655, 547 S.E.2d at 488 (Eagles, C.J., dissenting).
80. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31A-2 (2001).
81. See id.
82. Shoaf v. Shoaf, 282 N.C. 287, 289-90, 192 S.E.2d 299, 302 (1972) (stating that a
parent only has the duty to support an unemancipated minor child). In North Carolina, a
parent's duty to support an unemancipated child continues past the age of majority only if
the child is enrolled in primary or secondary school and is making "satisfactory academic
progress towards graduation." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.4(c); see 2 SUZANNE REYNOLDS,
LEE'S NORTH CAROLINA FAMILY LAW § 10.22 (5th ed. 1999 & Supp. 2002); 3
REYNOLDS, supra, § 15.4d (rev. 5th ed. 2002) (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.4(c)). Even
if the child is still enrolled in primary or secondary school, the parent's support obligation
terminates when the child turns twenty. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.4(c)(2); 3 REYNOLDS,
supra, § 15.4d (rev. 5th ed. 2002) (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.4(c)). North Carolina
does not require parents to support their disabled children past the age of majority, unless
they meet the generally applicable requirements of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50.13.4(c). See 2
REYNOLDS, supra, § 10.21 (5th ed. 1999); 3 REYNOLDS, supra, § 15.4d (rev. 5th ed. 2002);
see also Jeffrey W. Childers, Recent Development, Hendricks v. Sanks: One Small Step
for the Continued Support of Disabled Children Beyond the Age of Majority in North
Carolina, 80 N.C. L. REV. 2094 (2002) (explaining that North Carolina does not require
parents to support their disabled children past the age of majority).
83. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31A-2; Appellant's Brief at 16-17, In re Estate of
Lunsford,

__

N.C. App.

-,.. S.E.2d

__

(-)

(No. COA02-904).
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has custody of a minor child." The fourth use of the term "child"
appears in the context of care and custody. Section 31A-2(1) allows
an abandoning parent to recover "[w]here the abandoning parent
resumed its care and maintenance at least one year prior to the death
of the child and continued the same until its death ....
"86

By

including the provision that the care and maintenance must continue
until the child's death, the legislature arguably implied "minor child"
because parents usually only have the obligation to support minor
children.87

The preceding discussion weighs heavily in favor of construing
the term "child" in the phrase "shall lose all right to intestate
succession in any part of the child's estate" as "minor child" and thus
limiting the bar on inheritance to the situation in which the
abandoned child dies as a minor.

Otherwise, it is arguable that

"child" would mean "minor child" in some instances and "child of any
age" in others.88 But because the statute has logical consistency
whether "child" means "minor child" or "child of any age," this
analysis does not require that "child" be interpreted as "minor
child."8 9 It is reasonable that the legislature used the term "child," as

opposed to "minor child," to ensure the broadest possible
construction of the statute to prevent an abandoning parent who did

not meet either exception from ever inheriting.

Because North

Carolina law provides that parents generally have no duty to support

their children after the age of minority,90 an objective reader of the
statute could reasonably interpret the term "child" to mean "child of

84. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31A-2; Appellant's Brief at 16-17, Lunsford (No. COA02904).
85. See Shoaf, 282 N.C. at 289-90, 192 S.E.2d at 302; 3 REYNOLDS, supra note 82,
§§ 13.1-13.2 (rev. 5th ed. 2002). A parent, however, can have custody of a disabled child
past the age of majority. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.8; 2 REYNOLDS, supra note 82,
§ 10.21 (5th ed. 1999).
86. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31A-2(1).
87. See id. § 31A-2; Appellant's Brief at 16-17, Lunsford (NO. COA02-904).
88. See Appellant's Brief at 16-18, Lunsford (No. COA02-904) (arguing that
construing section 31A-2 to bar an abandoning parent from inheriting from an adult child
results in the term "child" having different meanings within the same statute).
89, See supra notes 43-51 and accompanying text. Mr. Lunsford argues that because
section 31A-2 cannot have "logical consistency" unless each use of the term "child" is
construed as "minor child," the court must interpret each use of the term "child" as
"minor child." Appellant's Brief at 16-18, Lunsford (No. COA02-904). This Comment
disagrees with Mr. Lunsford's conclusion.
90. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
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any age" because it seems evident that the legislature did not intend
to impose indefinite support requirements.91
Also relevant is the use of the term "child" in the Intestate
Succession Act, specifically as that term is used in section 29-15(3),
which prescribes when parents can inherit from their children.92 The
meaning of the term "child" in section 29-15(3) is evidence of the
meaning of that term in section 31A-2 because the North Carolina
Supreme Court has held that section 31A-2 "must be deemed a part
of the Intestate Succession Act and a modification of G.S. 29-15(3), as
fully as if it had been written thereinto or specifically designated as an
amendment thereto." 93 While the term "child" is not specifically
defined in the Intestate Succession Act, it is always used to refer to
91. The statute does not mention any additional support requirements. See § 31A-2.
Based on a February 2003 search of cases citing section 31A-2, no court has ever construed
section 31A-2 as requiring support past the age of majority. The results of this search
comprise the decisions of the highest court that issued an opinion in cases citing section
31A-2. See Manning v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 330 F. Supp. 1198 (E.D. Md. 1971);
Williford v. Williford, 288 N.C. 506, 219 S.E.2d 220 (1975); Smith v. Allied Exterminators,
Inc., 279 N.C. 583, 184 S.E.2d 296 (1971); In re Peacock, 261 N.C. 749, 136 S.E.2d 91
(1964); McKinney v. Richitelli, No. COA01-727, 2002 WL 553980 (N.C. Ct. App. Apr. 16,
2002), discretionary review granted, 355 N.C. 750, 565 S.E.2d 669 (2002); Davis v.
MacMillan, 148 N.C. App. 248, 558 S.E.2d 210, discretionary review denied, 355 N.C. 490,
563 S.E.2d 564 (2002); Hixson v. Krebs, 136 N.C. App. 183, 523 S.E.2d 684 (1999), cert.
denied, 352 N.C. 356, 544 S.E.2d 546 (2000); In re Estates of Barrow, 122 N.C. App. 717,
471 S.E.2d 669, discretionaryreview dismissed as moot, 344 N.C. 734, 478 S.E.2d 1 (1996);
Lessard v. Lessard, 77 N.C. App. 97, 334 S.E.2d 475 (1985), affid per curiam, 316 N.C. 546,
342 S.E.2d 522 (1986). Thus, the legislature could reasonably have used the term "child"
to refer to the abandoning parent's child regardless of the child's age. Under this
construction, support requirements would generally end at the age of majority, but the
abandoning parent would be forever barred from inheriting.
92. See § 29-15(3). Section 29-15(3) states that "[i]f the intestate is not survived by a
child, children or any lineal descendant of a deceased child or children, but is survived by
both parents, they shall take in equal shares."
93. Williford, 288 N.C. at 508-09, 219 S.E.2d at 222. As a technical matter, it is
arguable that the definition of child in section 29-15(3) is not an intrinsic aid but is an
extrinsic aid because section 29-15(3) is actually part of a separate statute. This distinction
is irrelevant to this analysis. The purpose of this analysis is to determine, using the
available textual evidence, whether child means "minor child" or "child of any age."
Thus, even if the definition of child in section 29-15(3) were considered an extrinsic aid,
the analysis would yield the same result. The use of the term "child" in section 31A-2
would still be ambiguous and additional textual evidence would be necessary to determine
its proper meaning. The next source of this evidence would be section 29-15(3), regardless
of whether section 29-15(3) is considered an intrinsic or extrinsic aid. Mrs. Bean argues
that section 29-15(3) and the holding in Williford conclusively prove that the definition of
"child" in section 31A-2 must mean "child of any age." Appellee's Brief at 14-15,
Lunsford (No. COA02-904). This Comment disagrees with Mrs. Bean's argument because
section 31A-2's "care and maintenance" language supports the opposite interpretation of
the term "child." Therefore, the definition of "child" in section 29-15(3) is not dispositive,
but is merely evidence of the true meaning of the term "child" in section 31A-2.
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children of any age and is never used to mean "minor child."94
Therefore, the legislature's use of the term "child" in both the
Intestate Succession Act and section 31A-2 (which modifies the
Intestate Succession Act), suggests that the legislature intended
"child" to mean "child of any age."
The intrinsic aids of interpretation-the use of "child" within
section 31A-2 and the definition of child in the Intestate Succession
Act-do not provide a conclusive definition of the term "child." In

fact, they may conflict. The court should therefore look to the policy
of the statute and its legislative history to determine the
interpretation the legislature intended. To determine legislative
intent, it is necessary to look at the circumstances surrounding and
the reasons for the enactment of section 31A-2.95 The legislature
enacted the predecessor to current section 31A-2 in 192796 in response
to Avery v. Brantley,97 a 1926 North Carolina Supreme Court case
94. See §§ 29-1 to -30. The Intestate Succession Act defines lineal descendants as
"children," which implies that "child" in section 31A-2 means "child of any age." See id.
§ 29-2(4); see, e.g., Betts v. Parrish, 312 N.C. 47, 49-53, 320 S.E.2d 662, 663-65 (1984)
(holding that a sixty-six-year-old decedent's property passed to his mother through section
29-15(3)).
95. The North Carolina Supreme Court has held that legislative history can be useful
in determining the legislature's intent in enacting a statute. In State v. Green, the court
stated:
[T]he legislative intent "... is to be ascertained by appropriate means and indicia,
such as the purposes appearing from the statute taken as a whole, the
phraseology, the words ordinary or technical, the law as it prevailed before the
statute, the mischief to be remedied, the remedy, the end to be accomplished,
statutes in pari materia, the preamble, the title, and other like means ....
" Other
indicia considered by this Court in determining legislative intent are the
legislative history of an act and the circumstances surrounding its adoption,
earlier statutes on the same subject, the common law as it was understood at the
time of the enactment of the statute, and previous interpretations of the same or
similar statutes.
348 N.C. 588, 596, 502 S.E.2d 819, 824 (1998) (quoting In re Banks, 295 N.C. 236, 239-40,
244 S.E.2d 386, 388-89 (1978)) (internal quotations and citations omitted) (emphasis
omitted). See generally Thomas P. Davis, Legislative History in North Carolina: ThreeDozen Cases of the Twentieth Century (Aug. 6, 2001), at http://www.aoc.state.nc.us/www/
copyright/library/leghrefs.htm (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (discussing
the use of legislative history in North Carolina).
96. Act of Mar. 9, 1927, ch. 231, 1927 N.C. Pub. Laws 591, 591-92 (repealed 1960).
The predecessor stated:
Provided, that a parent, or parents, who has wilfully abandoned the care,
custody, nurture and maintenance of such child to its kindred, relatives or other
person, shall forfeit all and every right to participate in any part of said child's
estate under the provisions of this section.
Id. § 1, 1927 N.C. Pub. Laws at 592 (internal quotations omitted).
97. 191 N.C. 396, 131 S.E. 721 (1926). Professor Bryan Bolich, one of the members of
the drafting committee for Chapter 31A, stated that the legislature enacted the
predecessor to section 31A-2 in response to the decision in Avery. W. Bryan Bolich, Acts
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that awarded an abandoning father one-half of the wrongful death
award for the death of his four-year-old child.98 Former section 28149(6) of the General Statutes of North Carolina, section 31A-2's
predecessor, was abolished in 1960 with the enactment of the new
Intestate Succession Act.99 The North Carolina General Assembly
then enacted a new Chapter 31A to update and consolidate all
statutes dealing with inheritance by unworthy heirs.100
In Quick v. United Benefit Life Insurance Co.,l l the North
Carolina Supreme Court used extrinsic aids to construe certain
provisions (other than section 31A-2) in Chapter 31A. 10 2 The court
primarily relied on three sources to interpret the statute: a Special
Report submitted to the legislature by the North Carolina General

Statutes Commission;10 3 a law review article by Professor Bryan
Bolich, who helped draft the statute;"~ and an earlier law review
Barring Property Rights, 40 N.C. L. REV. 175, 184 (1962); see also Anne-Marie E. Rhodes,
Abandoning Parents Under Intestacy: Where We Are, Where We Need to Go, 27 IND. L.
REV. 517, 532-33 (1994) (discussing the history of section 31A-2). The North Carolina
Supreme Court has cited Professor Bolich's article as an authoritative source of the
legislative history of Chapter 31A. See Quick v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 287 N.C. 47,
52-53, 55-56, 213 S.E.2d 563, 566-67, 568 (1975) (quoting Bolich, supra, at 193-94, 221).
Oddly, no North Carolina court has ever specifically stated that section 31A-2 and its
predecessor were enacted in response to Avery. The North Carolina Supreme Court has
recognized, however, that because of section 31A-2, Avery is no longer good law. See
Williford, 288 N.C. at 509,219 S.E.2d at 223.
98. Avery, 191 N.C. at 398, 400, 131 S.E. at 721,723.
99. Act of June 10, 1959, ch. 879, § 1, 1959 N.C. Sess. Laws 886, 886 (codified as
amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 29-1 to -30 (2001)); GENERAL STATUTES COMMISSION,
SPECIAL REPORT OF THE GENERAL STATUTES COMMISSION ON AN ACT TO BE
ENTITLED "ACTS BARRING PROPERTY RIGHTS," at 4 (Feb. 8, 1961) [hereinafter
SPECIAL REPORT]; see also Quick, 287 N.C. at 51-52, 55, 57, 213 S.E.2d at 565-66, 568, 569

(citing the Special Report as authoritative evidence of the legislative intent behind Chapter
31A). In conjunction with the passage of the new Intestate Succession Act, the North
Carolina legislature requested that the General Statutes Commission ("Commission")
draft comprehensive legislation preventing unworthy heirs from inheriting through
intestate succession. The Commission asked Professors Fred B. McCall, Bryan Bolich,
and Norman A. Wiggins to serve on a committee to draft the new Act. SPECIAL REPORT,
supra, at 1. The Commission submitted the Special Report, containing the new statute and
the drafting committee's commentary, to the North Carolina General Assembly on
February 8, 1961. Id.
100. See Act of Apr. 13, 1961, ch. 210, 1961 N.C. Sess. Laws 350 (codified as amended
at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 31A-1 to 31A-15 (2001)); SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 99, at 1-3.
101. 287 N.C. 47, 213 S.E.2d 563 (1975).
102. See generally BLACK, supra note 77, at 275-316 (discussing the use of extrinsic
aids); 2A SINGER, supra note 41, § 45:14 (defining extrinsic aids as "information which
comprises the background of the text, such as legislative history and related statutes").
103. Quick, 287 N.C. at 51-52, 55, 57, 213 S.E.2d at 565-66, 568, 569 (citing SPECIAL
REPORT, supra note 99).
104. Id. at 52-53, 55-56, 213 S.E.2d at 566-67, 568 (citing Bolich, supra note 97, at 193-

94,221).
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article by Professor John Wade, who drafted the model act on which
most of Chapter 31A is based. 1°5 This Comment applies these
extrinsic aids to interpret section 31A-2. Professor Wade's model act
was a slayer act-an act designed to prevent slayers from profiting
from their wrongdoing. 1 6 Because his model act did not include a
provision to prevent abandoning parents from inheriting, 017 the
Special Report and the Bolich article are the primary sources for
determining the legislature's reasons for enacting section 31A-2. The
Special Report states that section 31A-2 was designed "to revise,
broaden, and reintroduce sec[tion] 28-149(6)." 108
Although neither the Special Report nor Professor Bolich's
article mentions whether the term "child" means "child of any age" or
just "minor child," ' 9 both sources discuss the purpose of the statute,
and that purpose serves as evidence of the intended definition of the
term "child." They agree that section 31A-2's purpose is two-fold: to
prevent the inequity of allowing a parent to inherit from a child he
has abandoned and to encourage parents to make amends with their
children by resuming their obligations of "care and maintenance.""'
Thus, an interpretation of the term "child" as meaning "child of any
age" rather than "minor child" more accurately reflects the legislative
intent behind the statute. To absolve the abandoning parent of all his
past wrongs and allow him to inherit from the child just because the
child dies after reaching the age of majority would be inequitable."'
Along these same lines, there is less incentive for a parent to resume

105. Id. (citing John W. Wade, Acquisition of Property by Wilfully Killing Another-A
Statutory Solution, 49 HARV. L. REV. 715, 751 (1936)). Quick, the Special Report, and
Professor Bolich all state that Chapter 31A is based on Professor Wade's model act. See
Quick, 287 N.C. at 51, 213 S.E.2d at 565-66 (citing SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 99, at 1);
SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 99, at 1 (stating that "[t]he Committee profited greatly from

an outstanding and comprehensive study by Mr. Wade"); Bolich, supra note 97, at 188-89
(stating that North Carolina's slayer act is based on Professor Wade's model act).
106. See John W. Wade, Acquisition of Property by Wilfully Killing Another-A
Statutory Solution, 49 HARV. L. REV. 715, 751 (1936) (stating that his model act is
designed "to take care of every situation in which the slayer may receive any benefit of
any kind as a result of the decedent's death").
107. See generally Wade, supra note 106, at 751 (proposing a model slayer act).
108. SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 99, at 4.
109. See id. at 3-5 (proposing a new section 31A-2 and commenting on the purpose and
reasons for adopting the new section); Bolich, supra note 97, at 182-85 (discussing section
31A-2 and the rationale underlying its adoption).
110. SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 99, at 3-5; Bolich, supra note 97, at 182-85.
111. See Appellee's Brief at 18, In re Estate of Lunsford, N.C. App.
S.E.2d
(-)
(No. COA02-904).
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the "care and maintenance" of his child if he knows that once the
2
child reaches eighteen, he is reinserted into the distribution scheme."
On the other hand, defining the term "child" as "child of any
age" prevents a parent who does not make amends with his child
before the child turns eighteen from ever being able to inherit from
her through intestate succession."13 The parent therefore has less of
an incentive to reestablish a relationship with the child after the child
reaches the age of majority." 4 The response to this argument, of
course, is that the legislature was not concerned with parents'
personal relationships with their children, but was instead primarily
concerned with ensuring that parents provide for the "care and
maintenance" of their children-duties parents owe to their minor
children, not their adult children." 5 Thus, under the statute, the
abandoning parent should not be able to redeem himself after the
child has reached the age of majority, the time at which these duties
expire.
In his dissenting opinion in Lunsford, however, Chief Judge
Eagles reasoned that section 31A-2 only applies when the child dies
as a minor because once the child reaches the age of majority, she can
make a will to direct the distribution of her estate." 6 Thus, if an adult
child does not want her abandoning parent to receive any of the
proceeds from her estate, she can write a will leaving the estate to
someone else. This observation is problematic at best. First, it still
seems inequitable for an abandoning parent to inherit from his child
solely because the child survived, with no help from her parent, to the

112. Professor Monopoli argues that the unlikely event that an abandoning parent will
inherit from a deceased child likely will not affect his decision whether to support his child.
Paula A. Monopoli, "DeadbeatDads": Should Support and Inheritance Be Linked?, 49 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 257, 281-82 (1994). Thus, a rule linking inheritance to support is an
inefficient way to promote child support. Id. Professor Monopoli notes, however, in
certain situations "society may still want to adopt a rule which links bad behavior to
forfeiture of inheritance." Id. at 282. She ultimately concludes that more states should
adopt "[a] carefully crafted rule that bars marital and nonmarital parents who abandon or
fail to support their children from taking in intestacy." Id. at 298.
113. Appellant's Brief at 18-19, Lunsford (No. COA02-904) (illustrating the effect of
construing the term "child" as "child of any age" and arguing that such a construction is
inequitable). But see Appellee's Brief at 18-21, Lunsford (No. COA02-904) (arguing that
such a construction is the only fair result).
114. See Appellant's Brief at 18-19, Lunsford (No. COA02-904).
115. See SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 99, at 4-5 (discussing the two exceptions to
section 31A-2); Bolich, supra note 97, at 185 (discussing how the exceptions to section

31A-2 were added to give abandoning parents an incentive to care for their children).
116. In re Estate of Lunsford, 143 N.C. App. 646, 655, 547 S.E.2d 483, 488 (Eagles, C.J.,
dissenting), vacated and remanded by 354 N.C. 571, 556 S.E.2d 292 (2001).
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age of majority.117 Second, this reasoning does not accurately address
the situation in Lunsford, in which the parents are fighting over a
wrongful death award, rather than the assets of Candi's estate.118 In
North Carolina, an adult child without a spouse or child can never use
a will to fully cut off an abandoning parent without the aid of section
31A-2 because a will has no effect on wrongful death awards, which
are distributed in accordance with the Intestate Succession Act.'19
Evidently, in enacting section 31A-2, the General Assembly fully
intended to prevent abandoning parents from sharing in wrongful
death awards, as the original statute was enacted in response to an
abandoning father who received one-half of a wrongful death
award. 2 A full consideration of the legislative goal of preventing
unworthy heirs from inheriting through intestate succession or
sharing in wrongful death awards strongly supports a finding that
"child" means "child of any age. 121
In light of the legislative history behind section 31A-2 and the
use of the term "child" in section 29-15(3) of the General Statutes of
North Carolina, this Comment concludes that the legislature intended
the phrase "shall lose all right to intestate succession in any part of
the child's estate' ' 22 to mean that an abandoning parent will be barred
from inheriting from his child or sharing in wrongful death proceeds
regardless of the child's age. As the majority opinion correctly stated,
the legislature did not limit the meaning of "child's estate" to "minor
child," nor did it mention the age at which the child dies. 23 The
legislature's goal in enacting this statute was to prevent abandoning
parents from profiting from an abandoned child's death, and a
117. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
118. See Lunsford, 143 N.C. App. at 647-48, 547 S.E.2d at 484; supra note 1 and

accompanying text.
119. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.

120. The North Carolina Supreme Court's decision in Avery v. Brantley, 191 N.C. 396,
131 S.E. 721 (1926), to allow an abandoning parent to share in a wrongful death award
spurred the North Carolina legislature to enact the predecessor to section 31A-2. See
supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text. Therefore, to properly understand the
legislative purpose behind section 31A-2, it is crucial to remember that its predecessor was
enacted in response to a wrongful death award. Given this history, any analysis of the
meaning of section 31A-2 must be informed by its effects on both the distribution of a
decedent's estate and the distribution of wrongful death awards obtained on behalf of the

decedent's estate.
121. But see Appellant's Brief at 21, In re Estate of Lunsford,

-

N.C. App.

S.E.2d ( ) (No. COA02-904) (quoting SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 99, at 4
(stating that " '[i]t can and does happen that [a] child is too young to make a will cutting
off the guilty parent' ")).
122. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31A-2 (2001).
123. Lunsford, 143 N.C. App. at 652-53, 547 S.E.2d at 487.
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construction of the term "child" to mean "child of any age" best
effects that intention.
3. Is It Relevant Whether Section 31A-2 Is Penal or Nonpenal?
Determining whether section 31A-2 is a penal statute is also
relevant to the definition of the term "child." After losing in the
court of appeals, however, Mr. Lunsford now argues that interpreting
"child" as "child of any age" is penal and therefore violates the
legislature's asserted intent in enacting Chapter 31A. 124 He relies on
section 31A-15, which states that Chapter 31A " 'shall not be
considered penal in nature, but shall be construed broadly in order to
effect the policy of this State that no person shall be allowed to profit
by his own wrong.' "125 Mr. Lunsford argues that if the court
interprets the term "child" to mean "child of any age," instead of
"minor child," the court would violate section 31A-15 by construing
section 31A-2 in a penal manner.1 26 He reasons that if the court were
to construe section 31A-2 as barring an abandoning parent from
inheriting from his adult child, the statute would be purely penal; the
parent could no longer reinsert himself into the distribution scheme
by resuming the care and maintenance of his child because a parent
has no duty to care for his adult child. 127 Thus, if the statute contains
124. See Appellant's New Brief at 14-16, In re Estate of Lunsford, 354 N.C. 571, 556
S.E.2d 292 (2001) (No. 362A01) (advancing this argument); Appellant's Brief at ii, In re
Estate of Lunsford, 143 N.C. App. 646, 547 S.E.2d 483 (2001) (No. COAOO-674) (lacking
this argument). Because Mr. Lunsford did not make this argument to the court of appeals,
it is likely that the authors of the majority and dissenting opinions did not even consider
addressing this point, as no North Carolina court has ever discussed whether section 31A-2
is penal. See infra note 145 and accompanying text. After remand, Mr. Lunsford
continues to advance this argument in his brief to the North Carolina Court of Appeals.
Appellant's Brief at 22-25, Lunsford (No. COA02-904). While this Comment ultimately
rejects this argument, because it is currently before the North Carolina Court of Appeals,
it is worthy of thorough analysis.
125. Appellant's Brief at 23, Lunsford (No. COA02-904) (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 31A-15 (2001)).
126. Id. at 22-25 (arguing that "[i]f the statute is not penal, it should not punish a
person for acts that occurred while a child was a minor and who later dies after the age of
majority" because once the child reaches the age of majority, the abandoning parent can
no longer correct his wrongs). Mr. Lunsford seems skeptical about the legislature's true
motives in enacting sections 31A-2 and 31A-15. See id. In his brief, he intimates that the
legislature was really doing one thing (passing a penal statute) and saying another (that
the statute was not penal). See id. He argues that although the legislature stated in
section 31A-15 that section 31A-2 should not be construed in a penal manner, in fact
section 31A-2 "is penal in nature, or has, at the very least, been used that way." Id. at 24.
Ultimately, Mr. Lunsford argues that the court should take the legislature at its word and
construe section 31A-2 in a manner that is not penal, and the only way to do that is to
construe the term "child" as "minor child." Id. at 22-25.
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no provision to allow the abandoning parent to absolve himself of his
prior mistakes, it would serve only one goal-punishment-and this
128
goal violates the asserted intent of the legislature.
The earlier analysis of the legislative history behind section 31A2 and the use of the term "child" in the context of the Intestate
Succession Act refutes Mr. Lunsford's contention that the term
"child" must be construed as "minor child" in order to comport with
legislative intent. Further, his argument fails to withstand an analysis
of why the legislature enacted section 31A-15. Mr. Lunsford correctly
recognizes that the purpose of section 31A-15 is to prevent courts
from strictly construing Chapter 31A. 129 But his argument assumes
that the legislature enacted section 31A-15 to ensure that courts
would not construe section 31A-2 in a manner that penalizes
abandoning parents.131 In his article proposing the model slayer act
on which Chapter 31A is based, Professor Wade discussed the reasons
for his section 15, which the North Carolina legislature enacted
verbatim (with additions) as section 31A-15 of the General Statutes
of North Carolina.' Professor Wade inserted this section because in
many jurisdictions, when the legislature enacted a slayer act, the
courts would find the act penal and strictly construe it. 32 He wanted
to make clear to the courts that the slayer act is not penal and
therefore should not be strictly construed.
Professor Wade argued
that the slayer act was not penal because "nothing that the slayer
already has is taken away from him; he is merely prevented from
acquiringproperty as a result of his having killed the decedent-this
' 34
in pursuit of a principle equitable in its nature rather than penal.'
As Professor Wade recommended, the legislature enacted section
31A-15 to remind courts that it did not believe Chapter 31A was

127. See id. For an analysis of whether construing section 31A-2 to prevent an
abandoning parent from inheriting from his adult child is penal, rather than equitable, see
infra notes 137-47 and accompanying text.
128. Appellant's Brief at 22-25, Lunsford (No. COA02-904).
129. Id. at 23 (stating that it "would appear the General Assembly wanted to avoid
strict scrutiny of [Chapter 31A] by claiming the [Chapter] is not punitive").
130. See id. at 22-25.
131. Wade, supra note 106, at 750-51. It is unclear, however, whether the legislature is
truly commanding the courts to construe this statute broadly because section 31A-2 does
not technically deal with a situation in which the unworthy heir, if allowed to inherit,
would profit by his own wrong; he would really be profiting in spite of his wrong. See N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 31A-2 (2001); Appellant's Brief at 23-24, Lunsford (No. COA02-904).
132. Wade, supra note 106, at 751.
133. Id.
134. Id. (discussing section 15 of his model act, on which section 31A-15 is based).
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penal and therefore they should not strictly construe it. 35 Mr.
Lunsford tries to demonstrate that the child abandonment statute is
more penal than the slayer statutes, but this argument is irrelevant to
an analysis of whether a broad construction of section 31A-2 is
impermissible under section 31A-15. 36 Because the purpose of
section 31A-15 is to ensure that courts do not mistake Chapter 31A as
penal and construe it strictly, a court's broad construction of section

31A-2 will not conflict with the legislative purpose behind section
31A-15, as a broad construction is actually consistent with that
purpose.
Mr. Lunsford next argues that notwithstanding the legislature's
statement in section 31A-15 that section 31A-2 is not penal, the

manner in which courts have applied it is penal; therefore it must be
strictly construed. 137 If a court determines that a statute is penal, it
will strictly construe that statute 138 by excluding everything that "does

not come within the scope of the language used, taking the words in
their natural and ordinary meaning. '1 39 To address Mr. Lunsford's
argument, it is necessary to analyze whether section 31A-2, as
applied, is truly a penal statute.

135. See SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 99, at 30-32. The authors of the Special Report
recognized the doctrine that when a statute regulates conduct (in this case the killing of
another person) that the common law had previously regulated, courts will presume that
the legislature intended to abrogate the common law with respect to any activities
previously covered by the common law but not covered by the statute. Id. at 31. The
Special Report states that the purpose of section 31A-15 is to codify explicitly that Chapter
31A does not abrogate any common law remedies that may be used to prevent slayers
from receiving property from their victims. Id. Chapter 31A shouldlnot be construed
strictly because it does not seek to supplant the common law. Id.; see also Bolich, supra
note 97, at 220-22 (discussing the reasons for section 31A-15). In Quick v. United Benefit
Life Insurance Co., 287 N.C. 47, 213 S.E.2d 563 (1975), the court found that Chapter 31A,
article 3 (the slayer act provisions) was not in derogation of the common law and should
not be strictly construed. See id. at 56, 213 S.E.2d at 569.
136. Mr. Lunsford argues that Candi, if she wished, could have written a will to prevent
him from inheriting. See Appellant's Brief at 24, Lunsford (No. COA02-904). As
discussed earlier, this argument is erroneous because a will has no effect on the
distribution of wrongful death proceeds, which are the focus of this litigation. See supra
notes 4, 116-18 and accompanying text.
137. Appellant's Brief at 24, Lunsford (No. COA02-904).
138. Vogel v. Reed Supply Co., 277 N.C. 119, 131,177 S.E.2d 273,280-81 (1970).
139. Jones v. Ga.-Pac. Corp., 15 N.C. App. 515, 518, 190 S.E.2d 422, 424 (1972). It is
unclear whether the legislature has the power to force North Carolina's courts to broadly
construe a penal statute. See 3 SINGER, supra note 41, § 59:7 (stating that "legislative
attempts to modify the old rule of strict construction have met with little favor from the
courts"). Thus, even though section 31A-15 instructs the court to broadly construe
Chapter 31A, if the court were to determine that the chapter is penal, it might still
construe it strictly.
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In the strictest sense, a penal statute is one that prescribes a

punishment for a crime.140 More broadly, a statute that levies a
penalty or causes a forfeiture of property may be considered penal."'
Section 31A-2 does not prescribe a punishment for a crime because it
is not a criminal statute. 4 2 The question, therefore, is whether it
penalizes Mr. Lunsford. Mr. Lunsford seeks to distinguish section
31A-2 from the slayer provisions in Chapter 31A by arguing that the
slayer sections fulfill the equitable purpose of Chapter 31A by
preventing slayers from benefiting from their acts.1 43 His position is
that section 31A-2, on the other hand, does not prevent abandoning
parents from benefiting from their bad acts, but instead punishes
them for these acts.'" A review of the relevant North Carolina law
and the policies behind section 31A-2, however, indicates that section
31A-2 is not a penal statute. No North Carolina court has ever held
section 31A-2 to be penal,'145 nor have courts in the nine other states
with similar statutes held those statutes to be penal. 46 As mentioned
before, Professor Wade, the architect of Chapter 31A's slayer statute
provisions, did not believe that a statute preventing unworthy heirs
from inheriting is penal. 47 The purpose of section 31A-2 is curative-

140. 73 AM. JUR. 2D Statutes § 9 (2001).
141. Id.
142. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31A-2 (2001).
143. Appellant's Brief at 22-25, In re Estate of Lunsford, N.C. App....
S.E.2d - (-)
(No. COA02-904).
144. See id. at 23.
145. No cases have discussed whether section 31A-2 is penal or should be strictly
construed. See supra note 91 (listing cases citing section 31A-2).
146. The intestacy laws of at least nine states other than North Carolina bar an
abandoning parent from inheriting from an intestate child. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 45a-439 (West 1993); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 391.033 (Michie Supp. 2002); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 72-2-124 (2001); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.4 (McKinney
1998); N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-04-09 (1996); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2105.10
(Anderson 2002); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2106(b) (West Supp. 2002); S.C. CODE

ANN. § 62-2-114 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 2002); VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-16.3 (Michie 2002). In
a 1994 article, Professor Monopoli identified eight states with abandonment statutes.
Monopoli, supra note 112, at 267. Since she wrote her article, Kentucky and South
Carolina have enacted statutes to prevent abandoning parents from inheriting. Mandy
Jo's Law, ch. 414, § 1, 2000 Ky. Acts 1402, 1402 (codified at KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 391.033 (Michie Supp. 2002)); Act of May 29, 1996, No. 370, § 1, 1996 S.C. Acts 2235,
2236 (codified at S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-114 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 2002)). A greater
number of states prevent an abandoning parent from sharing in wrongful death proceeds.
Emile F. Short, Annotation, Parent's Desertion, Abandonment, or Failure to Support
Minor Child as Affecting Right or Measure of Recovery for Wrongful Death of Child, 53
A.L.R.3d 566, 569 (1973). A February 2003 search of case law in the nine states other than
North Carolina with statutes barring abandoning parents from inheriting revealed no cases
discussing whether those statutes should be construed strictly.
147. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
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it is designed to encourage abandoning parents to comply with child
support orders and to reestablish relationships with their children.
This Comment argues that section 31A-2 is not penal and
therefore should not be strictly construed. Even assuming the statute
is penal, a strict construction of the statute would not force a court to
construe the term "child" to mean "minor child." Mr. Lunsford is
correct when he states that "[p]enal statutes must be strictly
construed to exclude everything from the operation of the statutory
language that is not within the reasonable meaning of the explicit
wording of the statute. 1'

48

But construing the term "child" to be

"child of any age" is "within the reasonable meaning" of section 31A2 because this is the definition of "child" used in the Intestate
Act. 4 9 It is also one of the plain meanings of the term
Succession
5'

"child."
In addition, just because a court must construe a statute
strictly, the court should not interpret the statute narrowly; instead,
the court should construe it in accordance with legislative intent. 5 '
One of the purposes of construing statutes strictly is to ensure that the
defendant knows what conduct is proscribed.152 In this case, the
conduct that section 31A-2 seeks to proscribe is child abandonment. 53
Whether the term "child" is defined as "minor child" or "child of any
age" has no effect on the definition of the underlying wrong the
legislature seeks to address. Even Mr. Lunsford does not contest that
the statute is clear that child abandonment is the trigger that could
prevent him from inheriting from his daughter. 54
148. Appellant's Brief at 24, Lunsford (No. COA02-904) (citing Hilgreen v. Sherman's
Cleaners & Tailors, Inc., 225 N.C. 656, 660-61, 36 S.E.2d 252, 255 (1945); Moose v.
Barrett, 223 N.C. 524, 527, 27 S.E.2d 532, 534 (1943); Harrison v. Guilford County, 218
N.C. 718, 721-22, 12 S.E.2d 269,272 (1940)).
149. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-15(3) (2001); supra note 94 and accompanying text.
150. See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
151. In re Banks, 295 N.C. 236, 239, 244 S.E.2d 386, 388 (1978) (stating that a criminal
statute must be construed "with regard to the evil which it is intended to suppress");
Harrison v. Guilford County, 218 N.C. 718, 722, 12 S.E.2d 269, 272 (1940) (stating that
statutes should not be "narrowly construed").
152. 3 SINGER, supra note 41, § 59:3 (stating that the doctrine of strict construction is
designed to ensure that persons subjected to penal statutes receive "clear and unequivocal
warning.., concerning actions that would expose them to liability for penalties and what
the penalties would be").
153. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31A-2; SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 99, at 4-5.
154. See Appellant's Brief, In re Estate of Lunsford,

-

N.C. App.

-

S.E.2d

__

(-)
(No. COA02-904). Mrs. Bean makes a much less persuasive and more cursory
counterargument to Mr. Lunsford's penal statute/strict construction argument. She simply
states that applying section 31A-2 to prevent Mr. Lunsford from sharing in the wrongful
death award "is not penal. Its application simply requires consequences to be imposed for
one's own sorry, irresponsible, and willfully neglectful actions." Appellee's Brief at 21,
Lunsford (No. COA02-904).
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Section 31A-2 is not penal and should not be strictly construed.
Even if courts were required to construe this statute strictly, strict
construction would still require that they construe it in accordance
with legislative intent. To effect this intent, courts should interpret
the term "child" to mean "child of any age."
C. Analyzing the Applicability of Section 31A-2(2) to Mr. Lunsford
After holding that the term "child" means "child of any age" and
not "minor child," the court of appeals analyzed Mr. Lunsford's claim
that the second exception to section 31A-2 allowed him to share in
the wrongful death award. 55 The court of appeals's analysis of
section 31A-2(2) is significantly flawed, and, if adopted by North
Carolina's courts, would effectively eliminate the statute's second
exception. The second exception to section 31A-2 states that
"[w]here a parent has been deprived of the custody of his or her child
under an order of a court of competent jurisdiction and the parent has
substantially complied with all orders of the court requiring
contribution to the support of the child," section 31A-2 will not
apply. 56 The court of appeals's decision in Lunsford focused on
whether the divorce judgment truly deprived Mr. Lunsford of the
custody of his daughter.'5 7 In support of its conclusion that the
divorce judgment did not deprive Mr. Lunsford of custody, the court
5 8 and Hixson v. Krebs,"9 the only other
cited Lessard v. Lessard"
North Carolina cases that have construed section 31A-2(2). Both of
these cases dealt with the significance of divorce judgments to section
31A-2(2). 60 A close reading of Lessard demonstrates that it has no
relevance to the question of whether Mr. Lunsford was truly
"deprived of the custody" of Candi because the issue in Lessard was
whether the father had "substantially complied" with the custody

155. Mr. Lunsford disputes Superior Court Judge Burke's April 12, 2002, factual
finding that he abandoned his daughter. Appellant's Brief at 9-11, Lunsford (No.
COA02-904). Mr. Lunsford argues that the evidence does not support a finding of
abandonment and therefore section 31A-2 should not prevent him from sharing in the
wrongful death award. Id. A determination of abandonment is highly factual and an
analysis of the propriety of the superior court judge's ruling is beyond the scope of this
Comment.
156. § 31A-2(2).
157. In re Estate of Lunsford, 143 N.C. App. 646, 653-54, 547 S.E.2d 483, 487-88,
vacated and remanded by 354 N.C. 571, 556 S.E.2d 292 (2001).
158. Id. (citing Lessard v. Lessard, 77 N.C. App. 97, 334 S.E.2d 475 (1985)).
159. Id. (citing Hixson v. Krebs, 136 N.C. App. 183,523 S.E.2d 684 (1999)).
160. Id. at 653-54, 547 S.E.2d at 487.
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order. 6 ' Hixson, however, squarely addressed the issue of whether a
divorce judgment actually deprived the abandoning parent of the
custody of his child. 6 2 In Hixson, the North Carolina Court of
Appeals reasoned that a divorce judgment did not deprive the mother
of custody because she had entered into an earlier separation63
agreement giving sole custody of their children to her husband.
Therefore, the court-issued divorce judgment only continued the
custody arrangement to which the mother had already agreed and did
not take custody away from her.16'
In Lunsford, the court of appeals disregarded the plain meaning
of the statute that supported Mr. Lunsford's assertion that he was
deprived of custody by the divorce judgment, 165 and instead reasoned
that because the divorce judgment did not terminate Mr. Lunsford's
parental rights, the exception to section 31A-2 did not apply. 66 To
support its construction, the court erroneously "analogized" from
Lessard and Hixson. The majority admitted that the divorce
judgment "granted sole 'care, custody and control' of Candi
Lunsford" to Mrs. Bean. 67 But it concluded that because the divorce
judgment did not forever bar Mr. Lunsford from seeking custody or
visitation of his daughter or prevent him from making child support
payments, it did not deprive him of the custody of his daughter for the
purposes of section 31A-2(2).'68 The majority thus thoroughly
misinterpreted the purpose of section 31A-2(2). Its purpose is to
encourage the payment of child support by providing an exception for
a parent who, while he indisputably had abandoned the care and
maintenance of his child, nevertheless made his required child

161. See Lessard v. Lessard, 77 N.C. App. 97, 101-02, 334 S.E.2d 475, 478 (1985). In
Lessard, the issue was whether the trial court should have granted summary judgment to
the plaintiff, the abandoning father, on the question of whether he had substantially
complied with the child support order. Id. The plaintiff, instead of making the full child
support payments each month, allegedly transferred property to his ex-wife to satisfy the
difference. Id. at 102, 334 S.E.2d at 478. The court of appeals held that summary
judgment was improper and remanded the case for trial. Id.
162. See Hixson v. Krebs, 136 N.C. App. 183, 190-91,523 S.E.2d 684, 688 (1999).
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. See Lunsford, 143 N.C. App. at 653, 547 S.E.2d at 487 (stating that "[tlhe 1985
divorce judgment granted sole 'care, custody and control' of Candi Lunsford to petitioner
[Bean]"); Appellant's Brief at 12-15, In re Estate of Lunsford, N.C. App....
S.E.2d -(
) (No. COA02-904).
166. Lunsford, 143 N.C. App. at 653-54, 547 S.E.2d at 487-88; see Appellant's Brief at
12-13, Lunsford (No. COA02-904).
167. Lunsford, 143 N.C. App. at 653, 547 S.E.2d at 487.
168. Id. at 653-54, 547 S.E.2d at 487-88.
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support payments. 169 To qualify for the section 31A-2(2) exception, a

parent need not resume the care and maintenance of his child; he
need only pay his child support payments.17 ° If the parent resumed
the care and maintenance of his child, he would not need the benefit
of section 31A-2(2) because he could qualify for the section 31A-2(1)

exception. Here the majority has significantly changed the meaning
of the clear statutory language.
The court also completely disregarded its holding in Hixson,
which turned on the fact that the abandoning mother had already
given up her rights to custody in an earlier separation agreement.'
The court further violated the rules of statutory construction by
disregarding the plain meaning of the term "custody" and replacing it
with "parental rights."'17 2 If the divorce judgment had deprived Mr.
Lunsford of his parental rights, there would be no lawsuit, because a

parent whose parental rights have been terminated cannot inherit
through intestacy;7 3 section 31A-2 is therefore inapplicable.'7 4 Thus,
169. See Bolich, supra note 97, at 185 ("It seems desirable to permit a parent deprived
of custody of his or her child to participate in the child's estate if the parent has supported
the child. Moreover, such a provision should encourage child care.").
170. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31A-2(2) (2001).
171. See Hixson v. Krebs, 136 N.C. App. 183, 190-91, 523 S.E.2d 684, 688 (1999). In
Hixson, the court focused on the fact that because the abandoning mother had given up
her custody rights in the separation agreement, the court-issued divorce judgment did not
take these rights away from her. Id. The court in Hixson held that the plain language of
the term "deprive" meant that, for the section 31A-2(2) exception to apply, the divorce
judgment had to take custody away from the abandoning parent. Id.
172. See Lunsford, 143 N.C. App. at 653-54, 547 S.E.2d at 487-88. In Lunsford, the
court of appeals, in direct opposition to Hixson's command that the court adhere to the
plain language of section 31A-2(2), failed to construe the term "custody" in accordance
with its plain meaning. See id. There is a significant legal difference between the
deprivation of custody and the termination of parental rights. A parent whose parental
rights are terminated no longer has any rights or obligations to his child. N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 7B-1112 (2001); see 3 REYNOLDS, supra note 82, § 17.44 (rev. 5th ed. 2002) (discussing
the consequences of an order terminating a parent's parental rights). Once a parent's
parental rights are terminated, he does not even have standing to seek custody of his
children. Krauss v. Wayne County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 347 N.C. 371, 374-75, 493 S.E.2d
428, 430-31 (1997). A parent who is deprived of custody, however, only loses the rights
and obligations of custody. Custody includes those "rights and obligations related to
giving care, providing protection, and exercising control over a child." 3 REYNOLDS,
supra note 82, § 13.2a (rev. 5th ed. 2002). Custody is further divided into legal custody and
physical custody. Legal custody "refer[s] to the rights and obligations associated with
making major decisions affecting the child's life." Id. Physical custody "refer[s] to the
rights and obligations of the person with whom the child resides." Id.
173. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-1112.
174. See id.; Appellant's Brief at 13, In re Estate of Lunsford, _

N.C. App....

S.E.2d (-)
(No. COA02-904). By equating parental rights with custody, the court
adopts the following logic: (1) Section 31A-2 bars inheritance through intestate
succession; (2) the termination of parental rights also bars inheritance through intestate
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the court also violated another rule of statutory construction-that a
court must construe a statute "so that none of its provisions shall be
rendered useless or redundant.' 1 75 By equating custody with parental
rights, the court effectively eliminated section 31A-2(2). Because the
court's reasoning contravenes the statute's express meaning,
principles of logic, and the rules of statutory construction, it should
not be followed.
On remand, although Superior Court Judge Burke found that the
divorce judgment deprived Mr. Lunsford of custody, he still found a
way to prevent the exception from applying. Because the divorce
judgment did not require Mr. Lunsford to pay child support, Judge
Burke held that Mr. Lunsford "could not comply with all orders of a
court requiring contribution to the support of Candi" 176 and therefore
section 31A-2(2) did not apply to allow him to share in the wrongful
death award. As a matter of statutory interpretation, the language in
section 31A-2(2) does not seem to require that the court order
depriving the abandoning parent of custody contain support
provisions. 177 It merely states that the parent must have "substantially
complied with all orders of the court requiring contribution to the
support of the child."' 78 Judge Burke reasoned that if there is no
order there can be no compliance, and without compliance the parent
cannot claim the exception.'79 The counterargument is that section
31A-2(2) does not mandate that there be a court order requiring
succession; (3) section 31A-2(2) only allows inheritance if the parent has had his parental
rights terminated; (4) therefore, section 31A-2(2) never allows inheritance, because a
finding that parental rights have been terminated precludes inheritance. See Appellant's
Brief at 12-15, Lunsford (No. COA02-904) (arguing that by substituting "termination of
parental rights" for the term "custody" in section 31A-2(2), the court of appeals effectively
eliminated the second exception to the statute).
175. Porsh Builders, Inc. v. City of Winston-Salem, 302 N.C. 550, 556, 276 S.E.2d 443,
447 (1981).
N.C. App....
176. Record on Appeal at 68-70, In re Estate of Lunsford, S.E.2d

-

(-)

(No. COA02-904).

177. See § 31A-2(2). The divorce judgment mentioned child support but did not state
why Mr. Lunsford was not required to pay any. Record at 7-8. The judgment stated that
Mrs. Bean is the "fit and proper person to have custody of Candice Leigh Lunsford, the
minor child" and that there were no outstanding support claims against Mr. Lunsford. Id.
Mr. Lunsford contends that the divorce judgment considered child support but did not
require him to pay any and he fully complied with the divorce decree; thus, he should
receive the benefit of the exception. Appellant's Brief at 13-14, Lunsford (No. COA02904) (citing Record at 7-8). Mrs. Bean asserts that the divorce judgment did not prevent
Mr. Lunsford from participating in the care and support of Candi, but he refused to do so
anyway; therefore, he should not share in the wrongful death award. Appellee's Brief at
8-12, Lunsford (No. COA02-904).
178. § 31A-2(2).
179. See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
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support, and with no order there can be no noncompliance, and no
noncompliance equals compliance. As a matter of policy, however,
allowing Mr. Lunsford to claim this exception might seem inequitable.
Professor Bolich stated that one of the purposes of section 31A-2(2) is
to encourage child support. 181 If the court order contains no support
requirements, this goal cannot be fulfilled. On the other hand, it
seems unfair to deny Mr. Lunsford the benefit of the exception when
the divorce judgment considered child support and he has fully
complied with that judgment. Therefore, because Mr. Lunsford
"substantially complied with all orders of support," he should receive
the benefit of the second exception to the statute. 181
II. REVISED SECTION 31A-2
As the above discussion of Lunsford demonstrates, section 31A2 is imprecise. Chief Judge Eagles noted that "hard cases make bad
law.' 8 2 In Lunsford, an imprecise law has made a hard case. If
section 31A-2 provided clear definitions of "child," "deprived of the
custody," and "substantially complied with all orders of support," the
court of appeals could have easily dispensed with this case. Instead,
the litigation continues. This Comment, therefore, proposes statutory
revisions to address the ambiguities in section 31A-2 and to provide a
better balance between the often competing goals of equity, the
decedent's likely intention, and precision.
A.

Location of the Revised Statute

The first question to answer when revising section 31A-2 is
where in the statutory scheme it should be located. North Carolina's
Intestate Succession Act is located in Chapter 29 of the General
Statutes of North Carolina.' 83 The statute barring abandoning parents
from inheriting from their children through intestate succession
(section 31A-2) is located in Article 2 of Chapter 31A: Acts Barring
Property Rights.'8 4 Chapter 31A is divided into four articles: (1)
Rights of Spouse; (2) Parents; (3) Wilful and Unlawful Killing of

180. Bolich, supra note 97, at 185.
181. See Appellant's Brief at 14, Lunsford (No. COA02-904).
182. In re Estate of Lunsford, 143 N.C. App. 646, 656, 547 S.E.2d 483, 489 (Eagles, C.J.,
dissenting) (observing that the majority misconstrued section 31A-2 to prevent Mr.
Lunsford, whom it considered an unworthy heir, from inheriting), vacated and remanded
by 354 N.C. 571, 556 S.E.2d 292 (2001).
183. §§ 29-1 to -30.
184. Id. § 31A-2.
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Decedent; and (4) General Provisions.185 The first question is
whether section 31A-2 should remain in Chapter 31A or be moved to
Chapter 29. Because it bars property rights, this statute logically fits
within Chapter 31A. 186 One of the general provisions of Chapter
31A, however, is section 31A-15, which states that "[tihis chapter ...
shall be construed broadly in order to effect the policy of this State
that no person shall be allowed to profit by his own wrong. 187 This
provision, as written, is somewhat inconsistent with section 31A-2.188
The legislature enacted section 31A-15 to ensure that courts would
prevent slayers, both covered and not covered by the slayer act, from
profiting by their wrongs.'8 9 This provision is inconsistent with section
31A-2 because 31A-2 does not prevent abandoning parents from
profiting by their wrongs (i.e., the parent is not the one who kills the
child), but rather in spite of their wrongs. Although section 31A-2
section
should remain in Chapter 31A, the legislature should amend
0
31A-15 so that it logically harmonizes with section 31A-2.19
The Revised Statute
Professor Anne-Marie Rhodes, an expert in the law of estates
and estate planning, identified five questions to consider when
drafting a parental abandonment statute: (1) who the parties are; (2)
what specific activities by the parent will preclude him from
inheriting; (3) how the abandoning parent can remedy past conduct to
allow inheritance; (4) how the parental bar will affect the estate's
distribution; and (5) what the procedure for determining
abandonment will be. 9' The following proposal attempts to address
the questions Professor Rhodes has identified, resolve the ambiguities
and inconsistencies Lunsford revealed in the North Carolina statute,
and reassess the balance between the competing interests affected by
section 31A-2:
B.

185. Id. §§ 31A-1 to -15.
186. See id.
187. Id. § 31A-15.
188. See id. §§ 31A-2, -15; supra note 131.
189. See § 31A-15; supra note 131.
190. As this Comment has demonstrated, section 31A-15 was enacted to ensure that
the slayer act provisions would not be interpreted strictly. See supra notes 129-36 and
accompanying text. The author suggests revising the first sentence of section 31A-15 to
read as follows: "This Chapter shall not be considered penal in nature, but shall be
construed broadly in order to effect the policy of this State that no person shall be allowed
to profit by [or in spite of] his own wrong."
191. Rhodes, supra note 97, at 537-41. Lunsford demonstrates that several of these
questions remain unanswered by section 31A-2.
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Revised § 31A-2. Acts barring rights of parents
(1) Definitions. For the purposes of this section:
(a) Child - When not modified by the term "minor,"
the term "child" shall have the same meaning as the
term "child" in section 29-15(3) of the General Statutes
of North
Carolina and shall not be limited to "minor
1' 92
child.'
(b) Deprived of the custody - A court order that states
that a person, entity, or agency other than the parent
has the custody of a minor child deprives the parent of
the custody of that child.
Whether the parent
abandoned or otherwise relinquished, voluntarily or
involuntarily, custody of the minor child prior to the
issuance of the court order is irrelevant to a
determination of whether the parent was deprived of
custody.

93

(c) Inherit - The term inherit includes the right to
distributions from the child's estate and also the right to
share in wrongful death awards.
(d) Minor child - A person is a "minor child" until he
or she reaches the age at which section 50-13.4(c) of the
General Statutes of North Carolina would no longer
require his or her parent(s) to make child support
payments.
(2) Subject to subdivisions (a) and (b) of this subsection and
to subsection (3), any parent who has wilfully abandoned the
care and maintenance of his or her minor child shall not
inherit from that child pursuant to the Intestate Succession
Act. The administrator of the child's estate must prove
wilful abandonment by clear and convincing evidence.
(a) This section prevents inheritance under the Intestate
Succession Act without regard to whether the child dies
as a minor or as an adult.'94

(b) If a parent is prohibited by this section from
inheriting from his or her deceased child, the property
of the deceased child shall be distributed pursuant to
192. See § 29-15(3).
193. See id. § 31A-2(2).
194. See N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.4(a) (McKinney 1998) (stating that a
parent may not inherit from his or her child if the parent "has failed or refused to provide
for, or has abandoned such child while such child is under the age of twenty-one years,
whether or not such child dies before having attained the age of twenty-one years").
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the Intestate Succession Act as if the parent had
predeceased the deceased child.195
(3) This section shall not bar a parent from inheriting
through intestate succession from his or her child when the
parent proves by clear and convincing evidence that:
(a) He or she resumed the care and maintenance of the
minor child for at least one year while the child was still
a minor196child and continued that care until the earlier of
either:
(1) The minor child's death; or
(2) The child was no longer a minor child; or
(b) The parent has been deprived of the custody of his
or her minor child under an order of a court of
competent jurisdiction and the parent has substantially
complied with any orders of any court requiring
contribution to the support of the minor child.197
Nothing in this subdivision shall be construed to impose
an obligation on an abandoning parent to seek to regain
custody or visitation in order to qualify for this
exception.
(4) A parent who is barred from inheriting through intestate
succession from his deceased child loses all right to
administer the deceased child's estate.198
(5) No provisions of this section shall be construed to
prevent any child from inheriting, either by will or by
intestate succession, from a deceased parent.
C.

Discussion of the Revised Statute

The revised statute answers the relevant questions raised by
Professor Rhodes and the ambiguities that are the subject of litigation
in the Lunsford case. To prevent (or at least limit) disputes over the
definitions of the terms "child" and "deprived of the custody" in the
statute, subsection (1) clearly defines these terms. The term "child,"
the construction of which was the subject of the Lunsford litigation, is
clearly defined to have the same meaning as the term "child" in
195. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2105.10 (Anderson 2002) (providing that "[i]f a
parent is prohibited by this division from inheriting from his deceased child, the real or
personal property of the deceased child shall be distributed ... as if the parent had
predeceased the deceased child").
196. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31A-2(1).
197. See id. § 31A-2(2).
198. See id. § 31A-2.
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section 29-15(3) in the Intestate Succession Act and, unless
specifically noted, is not limited to "minor child." 199 The revised
statute clearly defines the term "deprived of the custody" to prevent
disputes over whether a custody order legally deprives someone of
custody. This definition not only clarifies existing law, but overrules
the holding in Hixson v. Krebs."' The change is designed to
encourage abandoning parents to comply with court orders without
the fear that a hypertechnical reading of the term "deprive" will
prevent them from inheriting. 2 1 The term "inherit" is now defined to
remedy the technical inapplicability
of current section 31A-2 to
22
wrongful death awards.
The addition of the term "minor child" is perhaps the most
significant definitional change in the revised statute. 20 3 The definition
of the term "minor child" is tied to the support requirements of
section 50-13.4(c) to ensure that revised section 31A-2 is consistent
with North Carolina law governing child support. Section 50-13.4(c)
governs child support payments and provides that, subject to two
exceptions, a parent must pay child support until his child reaches the
age of majority. 2°4 The first exception terminates child support
obligations before the age of majority if the child is emancipated.2 5
The second exception extends child support obligations until the age
of twenty if the child is enrolled in primary or secondary school and 20is6
making "satisfactory academic progress towards graduation.
Defining "minor child" in accordance with section 50-13.4(c) makes
clear that abandoning a child after the child reaches the age of
majority but prior to her completion of primary or secondary school
could prevent a parent from inheriting from that child. This
definition also promotes the curative aspect of section 31A-2 by
199. See id. § 29-15(3).
200. 136 N.C. App. 183, 523 S.E.2d 684 (1999); see supra notes 162-64 and
accompanying text.
201. See supra notes 162-64 and accompanying text.
202. Section 31A-2 states that an abandoning parent "shall lose all right to intestate
succession in any part of the child's estate." § 31A-2 (emphasis added). It specifically
limits its operation to the child's estate. Wrongful death proceeds, however, are not part
of the child's estate. Although this is a hypertechnical point that the courts have correctly
disregarded, the proposed statute corrects it to avoid any ambiguities.
203. This statute does not follow Professor Rhodes's advice against using limiting
language such as "minor." Her concern was that a limiting term would lead to questions
about the timing of the death of the child. Rhodes, supra note 97, at 537-38. As the
litigation in Lunsford demonstrates, the omission of limiting and explanatory language
may cause more problems than it solves.
204. § 50-13.4(c); see supra note 82.
205. § 50-13.4(c)(1).
206. Id. § 50-13.4(c)(2).
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requiring that for abandoning parents to qualify for exception (3)(b),
they must make child support payments to the full extent of the law.
Subsection (2) clarifies existing law by explicitly stating that
whether the child dies as a minor or an adult makes no difference in
whether the abandoning parent will inherit. 2°7 This subsection does,
however, add a procedural change, requiring the estate administrator
to prove wilful abandonment by clear and convincing evidence. The
revised statute adopts this standard to protect parents against false
claims of abandonment,2 8 add certainty to the intestate distribution
system,20 9 and harmonize section 31A-2 with the law governing
termination of parental rights.210
Subsection (3) is primarily a clarification of existing law, but it
contains two notable modifications. Just like current section 31A2(1), subsection (3)(a) requires one year of both care and
maintenance before an abandoning parent may inherit. It clarifies
current section 31A-2(1) by explicitly stating that this care and
maintenance must be performed while the child is still dependent on
her parents for support.2 11 Subsection (3) departs from the current
statute by requiring abandoning parents to prove by clear and
convincing evidence that they meet exception (3)(a) or (3)(b). This
heightened burden is imposed to make the abandoning parent's
207. See N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.4(a) (McKinney 1998); supra note
194.

208. The proposed statute adds this clear and convincing standard to dissuade frivolous
charges of abandonment and to ensure that the court will only find abandonment when it
is clearly shown by the evidence.
209. One of the goals of intestate succession statutes is to promote certainty in the
distribution of the decedent's estate. See Margaret M. Mahoney, Stepfamilies in the Law
of Intestate Succession and Wills, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 917, 931 (1989). Certainty is
promoted by basing inheritance on easily ascertainable familial relationships. Revised
section 31A-2, like current section 31A-2, reduces the certainty in the Intestate Succession
Act by basing inheritance not just on a parent's relationship to the deceased (which in
most cases is readily ascertainable from the decedent's birth certificate), but on whether
the parent abandoned the child. The question of abandonment adds an additional factual
inquiry to what is generally a reasonably straightforward process.
210. Barring a parent from inheriting from his child is highly analogous to depriving
him of his parental rights-his last right as a parent over his deceased child is to inherit
through intestacy. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-1111(b) (providing that the petitioner must
show that termination of parental rights is supported by "clear and convincing evidence").
211. Subsection (3) addresses the issue currently being litigated in McKinney v.
Richitelli, No. COA01-727, 2002 WL 553980 (N.C. Ct. App. Apr. 16, 2002), discretionary
review granted, 355 N.C. 750, 565 S.E.2d 669 (2002). The question in McKinney is whether
an abandoning parent who resumes the care and maintenance of his child after the child
reaches the age of majority can meet the first exception to section 31A-2. Id. at *3.
Subsection (3) clearly answers this question in the negative. In so doing, the proposed
statute reiterates that parents must meet their obligations to their minor children and postmajority attempts to remedy past abandonment will be ineffective.
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burden consistent with that of the administrator, dissuade frivolous
claims by abandoning parents, and promote greater certainty in the
intestate succession laws.212
The other significant departure of subsection (3) from current
section 31A-2 is in the method by which an abandoning parent can
avoid disinheritance by complying with a court order. As discussed
above, the revised statute modifies the definition of "deprived" to
overrule Hixson v. Krebs.213 Subsection (3)(b) also provides that the
parent must show that he "has substantially complied with any orders
of any court." The use of the term "any," instead of the term "all,"
before the term "order" explicitly rejects Superior Court Judge
Burke's reasoning that because the divorce decree giving Mrs. Bean
custody of Candi did not require Mr. Lunsford to make child support
payments, he could not have complied with the statutory exception.214
The insertion of the phrase "of any court" codifies the requirement
that to be reinserted into the inheritance scheme, the abandoning
parent must comply with all support orders, whether or not issued by
the court that deprived him of custody.215 The current statute implies
this requirement, but subsection (3) makes it explicit. Further, the
revised statute states explicitly that parents are not required to try to
regain custody in order to meet the exception to the bar on
inheritance. This provision rejects the majority's holding in Lunsford
that Mr. Lunsford was not deprived of custody because he could have
tried to regain custody.216 The final two subsections of the revised
statute merely codify existing law.
Revised section 31A-2 both clarifies and modifies current section
31A-2. Most importantly, it codifies the notion that an abandoning
parent is forever barred from inheriting through intestate succession
if he abandons his minor child and does not meet one of the statutory
exceptions during his child's minority. Thus, the revised statute
executes the legislative intent to shift the burden to an adult child to
specifically include an abandoning parent in her will if she wishes him
to inherit. It rejects an interpretation of "child" as "minor child"
because, as a matter of policy, a parent should not inherit from a child
212. See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
213. See supra notes 200-01 and accompanying text.
214. See supra notes 176-81 and accompanying text. As discussed supra, it seems
unfair to prevent a parent from inheriting for not paying child support when the custody
order does not require it.
215. This provision ensures that an abandoning parent must comply with all valid
support orders to be allowed to inherit.
216. See In re Estate of Lunsford, 143 N.C. App. 646, 653-54, 547 S.E.2d 483, 487-88,
vacated and remanded by 354 N.C. 571, 556 S.E.2d 292 (2001).
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through intestaie succession merely because the child, through no

efforts of the parent, survives until age eighteen. The revised statute
also recognizes, as demonstrated in Lunsford, that typical eighteen-

year-olds do not draft wills.
D. Revised Section 31A-2 and Wrongful Death Awards
The revised statute, therefore, operates equitably with respect to
intestate succession. It clearly specifies under what circumstances an
abandoning parent will inherit through intestate succession from his
child. The revised statute is arguably still deficient, however, in its
application to wrongful death awards. Because wrongful death awards
always pass by intestacy, even if the child writes a will including a
parent as a beneficiary, revised section 31A-2 would still prohibit that
parent from sharing in a wrongful death award. 217 In certain
situations the inflexibility in the wrongful death statute could lead to
inequitable results for an abandoning parent who tries to recover a
wrongful death award on behalf of an adult child.218

217. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
218. Consider the absurd result that would be reached in the following hypothetical: A
parent abandons his minor child but reestablishes relations with her when she is eighteen.
He puts her through college and law school. He then helps her purchase a house. None of
these activities qualify as "care and maintenance" under the statute, as they are not legal
obligations of the parent. See Hixson v. Krebs, 136 N.C. App. 183, 185, 523 S.E.2d 684,
685 (1999) (citations omitted) (quoting Pratt v. Bishop, 257 N.C. 486, 501, 126 S.E.2d 597,
608 (1962)) (stating that care and maintenance are the parent's " 'natural and legal
obligations' "); supra note 30. As discussed supra, except in limited situations, parents
have no legal obligation to support their children past the age of majority. Supra note 82
and accompanying text. Decades later, the parent, who now has a close relationship with
his child, has grown old and ill and is fully dependent on the child for support. The child is
divorced and has no children. She is tragically killed by a drunk driver. In this situation,
the parent needs part of the wrongful death award, but he is not entitled to it because he
abandoned the child decades before. The current state of their relationship is irrelevant.
Mr. Lunsford uses a similar hypothetical in his brief to illustrate this point. See
Appellant's Brief at 18-19, In re Estate of Lunsford, _

N.C. App.

-,

-

S.E.2d

__

(-)
(No. COA02-904). This hypothetical rests on an understanding of section 31A-2(1)
that parents cannot use post-majority attempts at reconciliation to reinsert themselves into
intestate succession. This reasoning is consistent with the legislative history of section
31A-2, which demonstrates that one of the statute's primary purposes is to encourage
parents to support their minor children. Supra notes 109-12 and accompanying text. It is
also consistent with the law of parental support. Parents are only legally obligated to
provide "care and maintenance" to their minor children. Supra note 82 and accompanying
text. As these are only legal obligations to minor children, it is only logical that parents
may only remedy abdications of parental obligations by resuming their parental
obligations-post-majoritygifts of love or money should not suffice. See supra note 211
(noting that this issue is currently being litigated in McKinney v. Richitelli, No. COA01727, 2002 WL 553980 (N.C. Ct. App. Apr. 16, 2002), discretionary review granted,355 N.C.
750, 565 S.E.2d 669 (2002)).
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Correcting the potentially inequitable effects of revised section
31A-2's application to the wrongful death statute can be
accomplished in two ways: amending revised section 31A-2 or
amending the wrongful death statute. This Comment focuses on
potential revisions to revised section 31A-2; a thorough discussion of
potential amendments to the wrongful death statute is beyond the
scope of this Comment.
A simple way to ensure that revised section 31A-2 never
inequitably bars a parent from sharing in a wrongful death award
would be to amend the statute so that it does not apply to wrongful
death awards. This would be tantamount to throwing out the baby
with the bath water. Wrongful death proceeds often represent the
most valuable asset available to the child's survivors. As a result,
allowing abandoning parents to share in wrongful death awards would
effectively eliminate revised section 31A-2.219
A more equitable way to address the inconsistency between
wrongful death awards and inheritance through intestacy is to make
the application of section 31A-2 to wrongful death awards elective.
The legislature could add language to revised section 31A-2 allowing
a child in her will to make clear that she wishes to negate the
application of section 31A-2 to wrongful death awards. An example
of language to this effect would be:
(6) The child's execution of a will complying with the
requirements of Chapter 31 of the General Statutes of North
Carolina containing the following or substantially similar
language will operate to prevent the application of section
31A-2 to the Intestate Succession Act:
"I wish to negate any effect section 31A-2 of the
General Statutes of North Carolina or any successor
statute may have on distributions to [insert name of
abandoning parent(s)] through the Intestate Succession
Act and ensure that section 31A-2 does not prevent
[insert name of abandoning parent(s)] from receiving
any distributions pursuant to that Act."
This proposal gives the child the opportunity to decide whether
an abandoning parent should be allowed to share in a wrongful death
219. Adopting such a rule would also be inconsistent with the law in the majority of
jurisdictions. Short, supra note 146, at 569 (stating that "[t]he overwhelming weight of
authority is that a parent's desertion or abandonment or failure to support his minor child
precludes recovery of damages for the wrongful death of such child").
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award. It also prevents litigation over the child's purported intent. If
a child includes the provision in her will, section 31A-2 will not apply
to wrongful death awards; if she does not, section 31A-2 will apply.
Thus, the provision eliminates potentially difficult questions of fact
that could slow down the distribution of a wrongful death award.
A disadvantage of this provision is that it is complex. A testator
likely would not even be aware that the provision exists. Because of
its complexity, unless it became boilerplate, it probably would not be
used. 220
A competent lawyer, however, could mitigate these
problems. He would simply need to ask his client a few questions
regarding the client's parents and any wishes she had with respect to
those parents inheriting or sharing in a potential wrongful death
award. And because the language is statutorily prescribed, the lawyer
would merely need to copy it into the will if his client wished to
ensure that an abandoning parent could share in a wrongful death
award.
Another way to way to modify revised section 31A-2 would be to
allow the abandoning parent to make a showing that he had
reestablished a relationship with his adult child and should be allowed
to share in the wrongful death award. The following statutory
language could be added:
(6) This section shall not prevent an abandoning parent from
sharing in a wrongful death award obtained on behalf of his
or her adult child's estate if the parent proves by clear and
convincing evidence that he or she established a continuous,
caring relationship with his or her adult child after the
cessation of the abandonment. The parent must prove that
this relationship lasted for five years while the child was an
adult and was present at the time of the child's death.
This subsection is narrowly drawn to ensure that it only allows
deserving abandoning parents to share in a wrongful death award.
The "five years while the child was an adult" provision is designed to
prevent a parent from circumventing the "care and maintenance"
requirements of revised section 31A-2. For example, a parent could
claim that he had always had a continuous relationship with his minor
child, but had never paid her support because he could not afford it.
220. E-mail from John V. Orth, William Rand Kenan, Jr., Professor of Law, The
University of North Carolina School of Law (Jan. 31, 2003, 17:53 EST) (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review) (stating that "[u]nless [subsection (6)] becomes boilerplate,

which I can't imagine, it will never be used").
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Without this provision, the parent might be able to share in the
wrongful death award if the child died shortly after reaching the age
of majority, which would be inequitable. In comparison with the
earlier statutory revision, this revision has the advantage of providing
the abandoning parent a share of the wrongful death award in
situations in which the child did not write a will. It has the
disadvantage, however, of creating more litigation by introducing
additional factual issues.
2 21
The legislature could instead modify the wrongful death statute
in a number of ways to ensure that it operates logically in conjunction
with section 31A-2. First, it could revise the statute to state that
wrongful death proceeds pass in accordance with the decedent's
will.2 2 This provision would carry out the child's intent. If the child
wrote a will including the abandoning parent as a beneficiary, the
abandoning parent would not be precluded from sharing in the
wrongful death award. Second, the legislature could radically
overhaul the wrongful death statute and distribute damages to
beneficiaries in accordance with their actual losses. 223 Thus, if the
abandoning parent could show that he suffered losses under the
wrongful death statute, he would be allowed to recover.
CONCLUSION

Section 31A-2 and its interpretation by North Carolina's courts
have created unnecessary uncertainty in the administration of the
Intestate Succession Act. The Lunsford litigation calls into question
the accuracy of Professor Bolich's statement that section 31A-2
"specifies with reasonable certainty the conditions under which an
abandoning parent may regain expectant rights or interests in his or
her child's estate. 224 The legislature should replace current section
31A-2 to achieve reasonable certainty and equity in North Carolina's
laws of inheritance.
HEYWARD

D. ARMSTRONG

221. Section 28A-18-2 of the General Statutes of North Carolina prescribes how
wrongful death awards are distributed. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
222. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-448(b) (West 1993) (providing that
wrongful death proceeds are distributed like other assets of the decedent's estate); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 556:14 (1997) (same).
223. Professor Robert G. Byrd has noted that by distributing damages in accordance
with the Intestate Succession Act, the manner in which the Act distributes damages is
logically inconsistent with the manner in which it calculates damages. Robert G. Byrd,
Recent Developments in North Carolina Tort Law, 48 N.C. L. REV. 791, 806 (1970).
224. Bolich, supra note 97, at 185.

